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INDIAN AND INUIT FAMILY LAW AND THE
CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Bradford W. Morse*
I. Introduction
Indian, Metis, and Inuit families across Canada are in a state
of crisis. The situation is so serious and the statistics are so alarm-
ing that one might be tempted to say that native families are in a
state of siege. Although there is always cause for hope, and there
have been a few positive developments recently that might fuel
some guarded optimism, the stability of native families is crumb-
ling as the social conditions are deteriorating, both within native
communities and in urban centers.
It is the basic premise of this article that the destabilization of
native families and communities is in large part a result of fed-
eral and provincial social services policies, provincial family
legislation, and the actions of the Canadian judiciary. The courts,
the statutes, and the policies all tend to reflect a common percep-
tion, that is, that the native people (the Inuit, M&is, and Indians)
are unable to meet adequately their own family needs through
their own policies, programs, and laws. An attitude, based on no-
tions of guardianship and superiority, has been adopted by our
society in recent decades that has justified, if not necessitated, the
intervention of the state and its agents into the native family
structure. This action has been well-intentioned but it has been
misguided and has had disastrous consequences. The interven-
tionist approach of the social service agencies has been aided by
the general lack of regard on the part of the legal system toward
the rights of native people and the validity of their traditional
family laws.
This article will address several related issues. The discouraging
situation in which native families find themselves today will be
briefly discussed in terms of its scope and its impact upon Indian,
Inuit, and Metis peoples. The second segment will concentrate
upon the content of traditional or customary Indian and Inuit
law as it is presently understood. The major portion will then be
devoted to an analysis of the case law in which it had been argued
that Indian of Inuit family law was valid and was to be recog-
nized by the Canadian courts. The possible success of such an
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argument being made under current legislation is also considered.
Finally, the article will conclude with some comments on possible
future developments in this field.
A substantial amount of public attention has been focused of
late upon the increasing political aspirations of native people in
Canada for the rights of self-government and self-determination.
The constitutional debates have provided a forum for native peo-
ple to pursue their desire for sovereignty and the recognition of
treaty and aboriginal rights. These goals are seen as an essential
aspect to the redevelopment and reinforcement of Indian, Inuit,
and Mtis cultural values and community life. The desire to break
the vicious cycle of dependence and achieve these objectives is
now beginning to have its effect on family law and the child
welfare system with the call for the transfer of control over ser-
vices, resources, and the law to native people so that they can be
created by, controlled by, and accountable to native com-
munities.'
II. The Dimensions of the Tragedy
Native people are suffering from the existence of a major
dilemma. Status, or registered, Indians are regarded as being sole-
ly within the jurisdiction of the federal government as a result of
section 91(24) of the British North America Act.2 Although the
government of Canada has enacted special legislation, the Indian
Act,3 which deals with a number of aspects of Indian life and In-
dian government, there is no federal legislation that directly ad-
dresses the relationship between status Indians and family law. Pro-
vincial legislation is generally relied upon to fill this gap by providing
general statutes that deal with the law regarding marriage, child
welfare, adoption, support, custody, and matrimonial property,4
1. See, e.g., Tripartite Task Group on Social Services, "Community Case: Toward
Indian Control of Indian Social Services" (unpublished, Dec., 1980, available from the
Indian Commission of Ontario).
2. 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (1867).
3. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, as amended.
4. This is by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Act, supra note 3, which states: "88.
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament of Canada, all laws of
general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in
respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with
this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder, and except to the ex-
tent that such laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or
under this Act." See, e.g., Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 751, 6 N.R. 491, 60 D.C.R. (3d) 148; Nelson v. Children's Aid Society, [1975] 56
D.L.R. (3d) 567 (Man. C.A.); Re Ranville v. Attorney General, [19791 26 O.R. (2d) 271.
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while the federal Divorce Act5 occupies the field in relation to all
divorces. This approach means that legislation is applied to status
Indians that is not tailored to meet their particular needs and values
but rather is enacted to cover the entire population.
The dilemma continues for status Indians because they are
caught within a financial squeeze and jurisdictional conflict. A
number of provinces have historically been unwilling to extend
child welfare and social services to status Indians for political and
administrative reasons. This situation was summarized in a 1967
government-commissioned report as follows:
[T]he special status of Indians, and more importantly the
policies and practices which have affixed themselves to that
status, have had the effect of placing barriers between an
underprivileged ethnic minority and welfare services which they
need. The assumption that Indians were "wards" of the
federal government, and that reserves were federal islands in
the midst of provincial territory has had the unfortunate effect
that basic provincial welfare activities have ignored and by-
passed reserve Indians. Indians have also been excluded from a
number of shared cost programs operated by the provinces
which received federal financial support. In general, the major
barrier has been the unwillingness of provincial and municipal
governments to provide services or expend monies on a minori-
ty group regarded as the exclusive responsibility of the federal
government. 6
Although strides have been made in extending provincial ser-
vices to status Indians over the last few decades, largely as a
result of arranging "bill-back," or cost-sharing, agreements with
provincial governments, status Indians are still not eligible for all
provincial services and benefits.' Some provinces, such as Saskat-
chewan and Manitoba, have been exceedingly reluctant to pro-
vide services in any but life-or-death situations.' The result has
been stated in these terms:
The arrangements between the federal and provincial govern-
5. R.S.C. 1970, C.D., as amended.
6. 1, 2, A SURVEY OF THE CONTEMPORARY INDIANS OF CANADA: ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL, EDUCATIONAL NEEDS AND POLICIES 316 (Hawthorne ed., Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1967).
7. See note I supra.
8. CANADIAN COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, LEGISLATION RELATED TO THE
NEEDS OF CHILDREN (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1979), at 107-108.
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ments for the provision of child welfare services to status In-
dian children are remarkably varied and at the level of official
policy bespeak tremendous arbitrariness and variability; at the
level of actual service delivery the policies of provincial and
local child welfare agencies are even more variable and whether
services are delivered or not depends on the availability of local
resources and the personal judgment of local personnel. These
circumstances are likely to hold even in Ontario where there is
a formal agreement with the federal government.'
The situation in reference to service delivery is less confusing
for other native people. The nonstatus Indians and Metis, who
number approximately 750,000, have clearly been viewed as a
provincial responsibility, whereas the Inuit are serviced by the
federal government as a result of their location in the far North.
This dilemma also extends to the type of service delivered
where one is available. Native people must accept the existing,
professionalized services, if they are available, or none at all.
These services focus upon individual problems and fail to under-
stand the connection between the individual, the family, and the
community.
Different cultural values also lead to different perceptions of
the problem and how to resolve it. This is particularly evident in
the child welfare system. The legislation in this field, and the
guidelines developed for children's aid staff in implementing it,
are very broad and flexible. This can give the professional staff
considerable latitude in interpreting specific provisions relating to
child neglect in light of their own cultural values and biases. Un-
fortunately, this can result in culturally insensitive interventions
in native families. Roman Komar, advisor to the government of
Ontario, has warned child care workers that
they can consciously or unconsciously become the vehicle for
the imposition of North American middle-class standards of
child care upon people whose social and cultural standards
happen to be different. Thus, the poor, immigrants and native
peoples seem to be singled out for special attention and it is
here that Courts must be vigilant to prevent misuse of the law
by agencies. 10
9. H. HEPWORTH, FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION IN CANADA 11l (Ottawa: Canadian
Council on Social Development, 1980).
10. R. KOMAR, MANUAL FOR CLERKS AND STAFF OF THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL COURTS
(FAMILY DIVISION) ON THE CHILD WELFARE ACT, 1978; PART II: PROTECTION AND CARE OF
CHILDREN (Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1979).
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There is also a tendency for poorer communication with clients
and a lower quality of services to result as a further repercussion
of cultural misunderstanding. Neil Stuart, in a recent report on
the quality of child welfare services delivered to the Indian pop-
ulation of the Sudbury and Manitoulin districts, stated that: "In-
dians in care are less likely to get specialized services than other
children, were more likely to stay in care longer than non-Indian
children, and were less likely to be discharged home. Workers on
Indian cases were more likely to be less experienced than workers
in non-Indian cases.""
Even the most conservative figures, which will omit many
Metis and nonstatus Indian children, demonstrate that in "1977
about 20 per cent of all children in care in Canada, that is 15,500
children, were native children." ' 2 Depending upon one's sources,
the rate of status Indian children in the case of child welfare
agencies is approximately two'3 to five times the national
average.' 4 The statistics in some provinces are frightening. The
number of native children in care range as high as 39% in British
Columbia to 44% in Alberta to 51.5% in Saskatchewan and 60%
in Manitoba.'" Even in Ontario where the rate is only 9%/ it does
run as high as 19% in northern agencies.' 6
These figures are even more startling when one realizes that the
divorce rates of status Indians are only one half the national
average 7 and the proportion of children released for adoption at
birth, or thereafter, by unmarried native women is dramatically
less than the general pattern. 8 Despite the fivefold increase in
child care expenditures by the federal Department of Indian Af-
fairs and Northern Development (DIAND) over the last two
decades,' 9 family conditions on reserves are deteriorating. The in-
crease in the federal financial commitment to child care expenses
for status Indians has neither minimized this tragedy nor has it
provided any tangible benefits to Indian communities.
When native children do come into the care of child welfare
11. N. Stuart, "Study of Child Welfare Services Provided to Indian People in the
Sudbury and Mani Districts" (Ottawa, Sept. 1978, unpublished), at 45.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 112.
14. INDIAN CONDITIONS: A SURVEY 24 (Ottawa: Ministry of Indian Affairs and Nor-
thern Development, 1980).
15. Canada Assistance Plan Ann. Rep. 1976-77, at 8.
16. Supra note 9, at 115.
17. Supra note 14.
18. Supra note 9, at 115-17.
19. Supra note 14, at 26.
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agencies they are usually removed from their own community and
their own culture. They are generally placed in nonnative foster
homes or group homes at some distance from their own com-
munity because there are virtually no such facilities within native
communities or under their control.20
The Royal Commission on Family and Children's Law of
British Columbia analyzed the situation in these terms:
In applying the policy of apprehension to native children little
allowance was made for cultural relativism. Once children were
removed they were usually placed in white foster homes or in
institutions far from their own homes, where it was difficult to
maintain contact with their relatives. At the same time their
families felt powerless to deal with the child welfare system.2'
The Commission further quoted from the report of Professor
Doug Sanders to the Law Reform Commission of Canada, where
he said:
True, there are some cases of serious neglect of children by In-
dian parents. The situation of Indians in North America has
led to drastic social disorganization in many cases, and often
the children are the first to suffer the effects. But often Indian
children are taken into foster care through court orders simply
because social workers feel they will give the children a better
opportunity off the reservation. Some social workers dominate
Indian communities so much that the Indians no longer feel it
worthwhile to protest the frequent removal of children from
homes .... 22
Indian, Inuit, and Mtis families are isolated from all parts of
the legal system, including child welfare legislation and the family
courts. The federal government commissioned another study,
which stated:
The legal rights of parents concerning their own children ap-
peared to be regarded too casually by the Indian Affairs
Branch and by other agencies. Indian people are, for the most
part, totally unaware of their rights and responsibilities under
child welfare legislation, and in many cases, have become
20. The author has been informed by the Ministry of Community & Social Services
of Ontario that there is only one Indian group home in Ontario.
21. ROYAL COMMISSION ON FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S LAW OF BRITISH COLUMBIA,
TENTH REPORT, NATIVE FAMILIES AND THE LAW (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1975), at 5.
22. Id. at 5-6.
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apathetic to the point where some do not even bother to attend
court hearings involving the custody of their own children.23
When Indian people and communities attempt to resolve the
problem of absent or inadequate parents through the traditional
approach of the extended family, by which grandparents, aunts,
or uncles of a child in need of care step in to raise the child or
adopt him or her, they encounter further problems with the
children's aid societies. Relatives generally will not qualify for
financial assistance as foster parents, and, even if unrelated, the
Indian adult who wishes to be a foster or adoptive parent is
evaluated according to criteria that emphasize material wealth
rather than cultural suitability. Another study commented upon
this difficulty by saying that:
[T]he attitudes and practices of child welfare authorities often
limit the participation of native people, either in adoption ser-
vices or in the general provision of all services. In addition, the
non-Indian, urban, attitudes of many social workers contribute
to a situation where these communities [Indian] are judged to
not meet these standards [provincial], the environment is
judged unfit, and the children are removed from the home.24
Years of domination and dependency render native parents less
likely to contest these actions through the courts. In addition, the
procedures for seeking out available services and demanding
those services, or their rights, are "alien to traditional native
ways of dealing with life. ,,25 This can lead to tragic consequences
and misunderstandings on the part of the white professional:
Thus native parents who have had their children taken into
care may not make persistent demands for the return of the
children or continued contact with them. This can easily be
misinterpreted as constituting abandonment, and reinforces
whatever negative images were formed about the parents in-
itially. In turn this can reinforce the native sense of futility in
making any impact on decisions made by white social workers
and white judicial officers.26
23. INDIANS AND THE LAW (Ottawa: The Canadian Corrections Association, 1967), at
18.
24. J. Girard, "Background Paper for the Evaluation of Child Welfare Services"
(Mar., 1979, unpublished, available from DIAND), at 6.
25. Quotation of M. Jackson and B. Morse, "Summary of Prince George Native
People's Conference" (unpublished, 1974), quoted in report at note 21, supra, at 16.
26. Id.
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This conflict in cultures and cultural values is particularly evi-
dent in relation to decisions on adoption placements. Indian and
Metis children are far less likely to be adopted than other
children,27 and, as a result, will stand a greater chance of remain-
ing within the care of the child welfare authorities until reaching
adulthood. This often means that native children will endure a
number of placements in nonnative foster and group homes dur-
ing their formative years. Adoption of native children is on the
rise, however, as the adoption of status Indian children has in-
creased by almost 500% since 1962.28 This dramatic increase does
not mean that these children are returning to native homes as it
reflects an increase in adoptions by nonnative parents.29
The net result of these events has been to create a sense of
frustration and futility in many Indian, Inuit, and Metis com-
munities. Very little has been done by the child welfare agencies
or by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop-
ment to mitigate the effect of cultural assimilation or to prevent it
entirely. Native people are beginning to discuss this situation as
reflecting a policy of cultural genocide. The Royal Commission
on Family and Children's Law observed this reaction and com-
mented:
The Adoption Act is sometimes viewed as one more weapon
employed by white society to destroy the Indian culture. It is
seen as a means of taking away the right of Indian bands to
take care of their own children and as a means of placing In-
dian children in white homes where they would lose contact
with their own race. 30
Indian communities have started to overcome the despair and
the pain by beginning to demand changes in the present system.'
The Spallumcheen Indian Band of British Columbia has passed
its own child welfare law3" so as to assert full control over all
decisions relating to child custody proceedings affecting band
members. This band is also involved in litigation contesting the
27. Supra note 9, at 118-19.
28. Id. at 120.
29. See note 14 supra; Facts and Figures, Indian Affairs Branch, DIAND, 1962-71;
Membership Division, Adoption Unit, Indian and Eskimo Affairs Program, DIAND,
1971-78.
31. See, e.g., the position of the Union of Ontario Indians in In the best interests of
the Indian Child, 3 ONTARIO INDIAN, No. 4 (Apr., 1980), at 18-24, and the reports of a
Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs demonstration in THE PROVINCE, Oct. 14, 1980.
32. By-law No. 2, 1980.
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right of the provincial government to apprehend Indian children.
These efforts and others give vivid expression to the desire of
native people to regain control over their fate and their future so
as to strengthen their communities and protect their most
precious resource-their children.One method of reasserting sovereignty involves recognizing the
validity of traditional or customary law. There is no question that
the indigenous people of what is now called Canada had their
own laws and legal institutions. Much of this traditional law .is
still in existence and is being adhered to, although the general
society may not realize it as such. It is easy to label children as il-
legitimate and parents as unmarried if one is ignorant of Indian
or Inuit customary marriage law. Therefore, the rest of this paper
will be devoted to examining the nature of traditional Indian or
Inuit family law and its position under the general Canadian law.
III. Traditional Indian and Inuit Family Law
It is virtually impossible for anyone, especially someone trained
in the law, to describe the family laws of the Indian, the Mtis,
and the Inuit peoples of Canada in other than broad generalities.
This writer's information is clearly limited as it is derived only
from his personal conversations over the years with native people
from across Canada, and from the scholarly writings of an-
thropologists and others. 33 These latter, secondary sources are in-
complete in that virtually no research has been undertaken with
regard to the Mtis and little work has been done in reference to
many Indian nations. The archival and field work which has been
completed is, by necessity, very specifically oriented toward a
particular community or region. Therefore, one must be cautious
in describing traditional family law as any description can easily
become an inaccurate representation of legal systems which con-
tained, and still contain, considerable diversity. Therefore, all
that can be done in this limited journey into native customary law
is to sketch a broad outline of Indian and Inuit laws on -marriage,
33. See, e.g., the customary law cases discussed in part IV; R. LANDES, THE OJIBWA
WOMAN (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971); L. TURNER, INDIANS AND
ESKIMOS IN THE QUEBEC-LABRADOR PENINSULA: ETHNOLOGY OF THE UNGAVA DISTRICT,
HUDSON BAY TERRITORY (Quebec: Presses Comeditex, 1979); D. JENNESS. THE INDIANS OF
CANADA (5th ed., Ottawa: National Museum of Canada, 1960); L. GUEMPLE, INUIT ADOP-
TION (Ottawa: National Museum of Canada, 1979); E. JOHNSON, LEGENDS, TRADITIONS
AND LAWS, OF THE IROQUOIS, OR Six NATIONS, AND HISTORY OF THE TUSCARARA INDIANS
(Lockport, N.Y.: Union Printing and Publishing Co., 1881); INDIANS OF THE NORTH
PACIFIC COAST (McFeat, ed., Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1966).
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divorce, adoption, and child rearing. With the foregoing caveat
in mind as to the dangers of overgeneralizations, some of the
common threads within native family law and the basic areas of
divergence will be indicated.
All Indian, Inuit, and Metis people, or "native people," share
the strong belief that children are their greatest resource and the
most cherished aspect of their society. The children are the most
important members of the community and, as a result, their well-
being is a collective concern, rather than one of interest only to
the nuclear or extended family. All adults in a community con-
sider themselves partially responsible for providing care, affec-
tion, and instruction to all children. Gordon Tootossis describes
this basic philosophy in these words:
The Indian belief is that if a child is left homeless, or with no
one to care for him, then the proper thing to do is to take the
child into your home as one of your own. . . . Children on
earth are not ours, they are given on loan. As Indian people,
we should respect the privilege given to us by the Great Spirit,
and do our best to fulfill our obligation, by loving our children
and caring for them properly. 4
The collective concern for proper care and upbringing of all
children is an integral part of the overall cultural outlook of
native people. The universe is perceived as a unified whole in
which all elements-the seasons, the plants, the animals, and
mankind-participate according to the rhythm of nature. The
view of the Dene, who are the Indian people of the MacKenzie
Valley, has been described in this way:
The love of the Dene for the land is in their tone of voice, a
touch, the care for plants, the life of the people, and their
knowledge that life as a people stems directly from the land.
The land is seen as mother because she gives life, because she is
the provider, the protector, the comforter. She is constant in a
changing world, yet changing in regular cycles. She is a story-
teller, a listener, a traveller, yet she is still, and when she suf-
fers we all suffer with her; and very often in many parts of the
world, whether they believe this or not, many people suffer
because they have abused their land. She is a teacher, a teacher
who punishes swiftly when we err, yet a benefactress who
blesses abundantly when we live with integrity, respect her, and
34. Quoted in D. SANDERS, FAMILY LAW AND NATIVE PEOPLE (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1975), at 183.
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love the life she gives. We cannot stand on her with integrity
and respect and claim to love the life she gives and allow her to
be ravaged. 3"
Another personal account of the Dene philosophy, which is large-
ly shared by all native people, gives this observation:
It seems to me that the whole point in living is to become as
human as possible: to learn to understand the world and to live
in it; to be part of it; to learn to understand the animals, for
they are our brothers and they have much to teach us. We are a
part of this world.
We are like the river that flows and changes, yet is always the
same. The river cannot flow too slow and it cannot flow too
fast. It is a river and it will always be a river, for that is what it
was meant to be. We are like the river, but we are not the river.
We are human. That is what we were meant to be. We were not
meant to be destroyed and we were not meant to take over
other parts of the world. We were meant to be ourselves, to be
what it is our nature to be.
Our Dene nation is like this great river. It has been flowing
before any of us can remember. We take our strength and our
wisdom and our ways from the flow and direction that has
been established for us by ancestors we never knew, ancestors
of a thousand years ago. Their wisdom flows through us to our
children and our grandchildren to generations we will never
know. We will live out our lives as we must and we will die in
peace because we will know that our people and this river will
flow on after us. 36
This perception of history as a continuing evolutionary flow
harmonizes with the appreciation of the earth as the mother or
source of all life. Each generation receives the wisdom of all past
generations and assumes the continuing relationship with the
land, giving respect and love to the earth in return for the earth's
generous bounty. The land is the mother of the parents and of
the children. There is, thus, an equality between adults and
children in their relationship with the natural elements. Native
philosophy contains the essential notion that the land must be
35. R. Lamothe, "Statement to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry," reprinted in
DENE NATION-THE COLONY WITHIN (Watkins ed., Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1976), at 10-11.
36. Frank T'Seleie, id. at 16-17.
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preserved as it is in order for the future to be secure. The conti-
nuance of the people is linked to the continuance of the land.
Therefore, the society places extreme importance upon the future
well-being of both. The children and future generations become
the means of securing this goal of permanence. Frank T'Seleie, in
his address to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, expressed
this philosophy by stating:
We know that our grandchildren will speak a language that is
their heritage, that has been passed on from before time. We
know they will share their wealth and not hoard it or keep it to
themselves. We know they will look after their old people and
respect them for their wisdom. We know they will look after
this land and protect it and that five hundred years from now
someone with skin my colour and moccasins on his feet will
climb up the Ramparts (near Good Hope) and rest and look
over the river and feel that he too has a place in the universe;
and he will thank the same spirits that I thank, that his
ancestors have looked after his land well, and he will be proud
to be a Dene .... It is for this unborn child, Mr. Berger, that
my nation will stop the pipeline. It is so that this unborn child
can know the freedom of this land that I am willing to lay
down my life."
Since the children are and have always been the hope of the
future, it is vital that they absorb all existing knowledge. In the
absence, historically, of a sophisticated written communication
system, information on all aspects of society, such as history,
culture, religion, nature, food preservation and collection, hous-
ing, law, and geography, had to be conveyed orally from adult to
child. Every adult assumes the role of teaching every child in rela-
tionship to all children so that future generations may benefit
from his/her knowledge and expertise. Responsibility is allocated
among adults on the basis of ability, with elders and grandparents
accepting the primary task of educating the young.
Since native people traditionally possessed subsistence econ-
omies in which survival depended upon the ability to live off the
fruit of the land, a communal approach to food distribution was
essential to the sustenance of the very young and the very old.
Therefore, there was a further reason underlying the importance
placed in children: they were the future suppliers of food to the
community. Adults knew that the time would come when their
37. Id. at 17.
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own personal survival would depend upon the generosity of their
children and grandchildren.
Thus, it was additionally important to raise the young to be
strong, brave, independent, intelligent, and generous. The native
people's belief in the integrity and importance of children causes
them to regard children as responsible human beings with minds
of their own. This respect for children's independence and free
will is reflected in child-rearing practices that have often been
misunderstood by commentators over the years as symptomatic
of laxness in child rearing and a lack of concern for the welfare
of children. The absence of tight discipline and corporal punish-
ment is simply a function of a different attitude toward rearing
children, one which, ironically, has attained considerable pop-
ularity in North American society in recent years. Generally, all
native societies rely upon persuasion and reasoning as the main
mechanisms for obtaining respect and obedience from the young.
This approach is buttressed by the expression of displeasure and
the use of ridicule and public embarrassment as means of enforc-
ing compliance with expected standards of behavior. As a result
of the mutual love and respect shared by children and adults in
native societies, these techniques are largely successful. Several
Indian nations did use corporal punishment as a last resort, but it
was used sparingly and was usually imposed by an uncle rather
than a parent or grandparent so as not to jeopardize the parent-
child bond.
Attitudes toward children historically were affected substan-
tially by the necessities of survival. The native people of the
North confronted an environment that demanded good health
and endurance on the part of all. The relatively hostile climate
and limited food supplies necessitated small communities with
restricted populations. Keith Crowe discussed euthanasia and in-
fanticide in the North by saying:
Under such conditions it was always difficult and often im-
possible for families to support the badly crippled, the mentally
disabled, or people whom old age had made infirm. Women
had to travel and carry loads through summer flies and winter
blizzards. It was almost impossible for them to feed, warm,
and carry two infants at the same time.
For all these reasons the population was controlled in the only
way possible, by the same means used in ancient Greece and
other parts of the world. Abnormal babies, one of twins, un-
wanted girl babies, were killed at birth by suffocation or ex-
posure to cold. Very old people were sometimes left to die
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when their families moved on, and often asked their children to
leave them or strangle them.
Such customs were a grim necessity to people without the men-
tal hospitals, orphanages, old folks' homes, and birth control
of modern times. When hunger no longer called the tune, they
were gladly abandoned.38
Infanticide and euthanasia appear to have been most common
among the Inuit as inevitable facets of the arduous life in the
Arctic."
Adoption appears to have been common in all native societies
in what is now called Canada. The Inuit particularly maintained a
system of adoption that was used with great frequency as a nor-
mal element in distributing the care for children within the com-
munity. Sanders summarizes the reasons for Inuit adoption as
follows:
(a) too many children, (b) children born too close together, (or
twins), (c) shortage of food, (d) the disbanding of a household,
(e) remarriage, (f) ritual assessment that the child is incompati-
ble with the parents, based upon illness or a difficult
childbirth, (g) a response to personal indebtedness, (h) to form
alliances, (i) pressure by adoptive parents, or, 0) to give a child
to a woman who may be depressed (for example by the birth of
a deformed child who is suffocated or exposed). The adopting
parents are normally related by blood to the natural parents.
The most common adopting parents are uncles and aunts, fol-
lowed by grandparents and followed by same generation rela-
tions.40
Baliksi examined the method and the motivation behind the
customary adoptions of the Netsilik Inuit and stated:
Couples who did not have children or who wished for more
could adopt unwanted children. . . . The strains of nomadic
life in this harsh environment were such that a hunter was not
very old before he had to rely on his sons to help him in the
hunt. Sons were an asset in old age. This was the main motiva-
38. K. CROWE, A HISTORY OF THE ORIGINAL PEOPLES OF NORTHERN CANADA (Mon-
treal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974), at 24.
39. See A. Balikei, Female Infanticide on the Arctic Coast, in M. NAGLER, PERSPEC.
TIVES ON THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1972),
at 176 et seq.
40. Supra note 34, at 71. See also W. Willmott, The Flexibility of Eskimo Social
Organization, in NAGLER, id. at 35.
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tion behind adoption in Netsilik society. Adoption usually took
place at birth and usually involved payment. The adoptive
mother fed the child with the mouth-to-mouth technique.
Although the request for adoption usually took place before
birth, any visitor who heard the cries of an abandoned baby
could take it home and adopt it. The adoption of girls can be
explained in two ways. First, mothers preferred to keep their
boys, leaving mainly girls for adoption. Second, the Netsilik
held the belief that the first-born infant of either sex should be
allowed to live, because that child's death might bring inisfor-
tune to later children. Frequently the first child, male or
female, was adopted by the grandmother and raised with par-
ticular care. It should be noted that a girl also offered old-age
security to her grandmother; the old woman could later reside
with her married grandchild. 4'
Although all Indian nations appear to have had a system of
adoption, it was not always used for the same reasons. Orphans
from within the tribe were always adopted by a sibling or the
parents of the deceased natural mother and father. The children
of defeated enemies were usually placed with families that had
lost a member in the fighting. Parents who could not care for a
child for any reason would arrange for another member of their
extended family or clan to adopt the child. In addition, many In-
dian nations had a tradition of giving the first born to the grand-
parents to be raised. This occurred out of respect for the wisdom
of the grandparents and the desire to maintain their active in-
volvement in the rearing of children. The presence of children
was seen as a sign of wealth and security for the future. A
childless couple would usually be given a baby at birth by a sister
or brother as a childless woman generally would suffer from
despair at her fate. Furthermore, the inability of a woman to bear
children could give the husband grounds for divorce and poten-
tially cause her family some embarrassment. Claudia Lewis re-
counts one incident which came to her attention:
According to her report, the baby was really reared by the
grandmother. She could not answer my specific questions
about the time and method of toilet training, for instance.
"His grandmother taught him. I only fed him and washed his
clothes." The extended family group occupied the house until
the baby became a boy of six. About that time the second son
41. Supra note 39, at 183-84.
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married, and the grandparents along with the second son and
his wife moved to a new home built with agency help. They
took with them the six-year-old boy, to rear him as their own.
I asked the young mother how she felt about having her little
boy live with the grandparents. "I don't mind. They treat him
well, and they only had two sons." This reply suggests the con-
cept, which I often heard expressed, that grandparents would
be lonely if they did not have children with them. As one of the
workers in the Indian Office explained it, "The Indians are
very generous with their children, you might say. Generous
about giving children to people who don't have any. They
think it's terrible for people to be without children. They
wouldn't think of leaving grandparents without some young
children around.' '42
Marriage laws differ substantially among Indian and Inuit na-
tions. Polygamy appears to have been possible in the majority of
Indian and Inuit cultures where wealth and food supplies would
permit. That is not to say that it was common, since only chiefs
or very successful hunters could provide for the extra dependents
involved in having more than one wife. The presence of addi-
tional wives, however, was viewed as a strong indication of the
wealth and status of the husband.43 A man might take more than
one wife if his first was barren or she was becoming too old to
fulfill all of her daily tasks. A first wife could easily be much
older than her husband if he had married his uncle's widow, as
was the Haida custom, 44 or the widow of a defeated rival from
within the tribe.
Marriage procedures also vary substantially from nation to na-
tion. Several native nations use a very simple process in which a
man and woman agree to cohabit together as husband and wife.
The Dakota have a two-stage process commencing with a trial
marriage in which the couple intends to stay together as long as
they are satisfied with each other. After a period of several
weeks, it is usually commonly accepted that a marriage trial is in
progress. If the couple stay together happily, then, after the trial
has extended for over a year, the community describes them as
42. C. LEWIS, INDIAN FAMILIES ON THE NORTHWEST COAST (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), at 120.
43. LANDES, note 33 supra, at 66-68. See also C. COLDEN, THE HISTORY OF THE FIVE
INDIAN NATIONS OF CANADA (London: T. Osborne, 1747) (rep'd., Toronto: Coles
Publishing Co., 1972), at 12: TURNER, note 33, supra, at 25, 106.
44. J. Swinton, Social Organization of the Haida, in NAGLER, note 39 supra, at 54.
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being permanently married. There is no formal process for ob-
taining parental consent, providing a dowry or presents to her
family, announcing the marriage, or solemnizing the marriage
with a religious ceremony. Divorce is equally uncomplicated: the
couple merely separates. 5 The Naskapi follow a somewhat
similar approach except that the consent of the woman's parents
or nearest relatives must be obtained. The suitor generally offers
presents to her family to obtain this consent. Since a woman mar-
ries prior to reaching puberty, she will comply with the family's
desires or be forcibly taken to the home of the husband-to-be. 4
The marriage law of the Cree requires the suitor to present gifts
to the woman's parents and to obtain their initial consent to the
marriage. The young couple then go to all the elders of the com-
munity with token presents and ask for their blessing. A day-long
wedding ceremony is held, which begins with the elders preparing
the groom for marriage. He is cleansed with the smoke of burn-
ing sweet grass and he then prays with the elders for guidance. A
special marriage pipe is given to the man by one of his relatives or
an elder and all present smoke this pipe. The marriage ceremony
itself is then held in which the young man gives further gifts to
the woman's family to show his ability to support his new wife,
and to the elders as an expression of respect and gratitude. Burn-
ing sweet grass is passed among all of the people present to purify
their minds and bodies. A chosen elder then tells the people that
the couple are to be married, which is followed by the draping of
a marriage blanket around the couple's shoulders by the chief.
The bride and groom then eat food from a single plate to indicate
that they will share everything in the future.
The wedding ceremony is followed by a marriage feast and
dancing, which commences with the marriage dance. This is a cir-
cle dance in which everyone holds hands to symbolize the friend-
ship existing within the group and the cycle of existence. The end-
ing of the feast signifies the conclusion of the marriage and the
acceptance of it by the entire community. The marriage is ex-
pected to be permanent and exclusive, but it can be terminated by
a simple separation.
The Inuit groups all appear to require the consent of both part-
ners to the marriage, both sets of parents, and other close
relatives. The groom is expected to offer presents to her family to
45. S. Corrigan, A Note on Canadian Indian Marriage Law, 4 W. CAN. J. ANTHRO.
17, 19-20 (1974).
46. TURNER, note 33 supra, at 106-107.
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obtain their consent, 47 along with a promise to adhere to the
"bride-service" custom by which he hunts and fishes for her
family for up to a year.4 8 A feast to announce the marriage to the
community will follow shortly after the marriage is blessed by the
immediate families involved. 49
Some Indian nations impose legal restrictions upon marriage
forbidding marriages within one's family or clan. 0 The Interior
Salish and Carrier Indians entirely prohibit marriage within the
bands, as all band members are considered brothers and sisters.
This forces people to find spouses in neighboring bands and
thereby promotes unity within the Salish and Carrier nations. On
the other hand, the Algonquin nations have a tendency toward
arranged marriages between first cousins,5' although this is not
always practiced.52 The nations of the Iroquois Confederacy also
preclude marriage within the clan. Being matriarchal and matri-
lineal societies, a marriage would be generally arranged by the
clan mothers rather than the couple, although the latter could
separate at will. A number of Indian nations that did not sanc-
tion easy separation permitted the wife to buy a divorce by repay-
ing the bride-price to her husband."
Metis people were devout Roman Catholics and as such tended
to comply strictly with the requirements of the Catholic Church
regarding marriage. If at all possible, Metis marriages were
solemnized by a priest, although all of the conditions involved in
the publication of the banns were not always met.
From the foregoing brief overview of traditional Indian and In-
uit family law, one can conclude that the social rules or laws
governing family life were known and followed. There are a
number of similarities in the legal requirements of the various
native nations; there are also many critical differences. It is im-
possible to delineate a single set of principles adhered to by all
native people. The diversity in social organization must be
acknowledged and respected in the recognition of customary law
47. Id. at 24.
48. CROWE, note 38 supra, at 56. The Naskapi also have a custom of bride-service,
id. at 44.
49. Re Noah Estate [1961] 36 W.W.R. 557 (N.W.T.T.C.).
50. E. Sapir, The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes, in NAGLER, note 39
supra, at 39-40.
51. CROWE, note 38 supra, at 43.
52. LANDES, note 33 supra, at 51-56.
53. See, e.g., the discussion of this system in Rex v. Williams, [1921] 30 B.C.R. 303
(B.C.S.C.).
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by the Canadian legal system and in the planning of any
modifications to the existing general family law. Certain values
are shared by all of the native societies, but differences in pro-
cedure and attitude remain.
IV. The Canadian Legal System's Response to Native
Family Law
The original inhabitants of Canada have, of course, followed
and applied their own laws, which included family laws, since
time immemorial. These laws varied from nation to nation, but
their presence was universal. Many Indians and Inuit in Canada
still continue to follow their traditional matrimonial property,
marriage, adoption, child welfare, and maintenance laws; and
this is most common today in the North. Unfortunately, the
Canadian legal system has not continually recognized the validity
of native family law.
In this section, the American position will be briefly described.
Next, the limited extant Canadian case law in this area from the
preconfederation era to the present time will be discussed. This
will be followed by an examination of the current provincial and
territorial legislation in force, in order to ascertain the present
status of Indian and Inuit family law. The emphasis will be upon
marriage and adoption law; however, customary and modern di-
vorce law will receive passing comment.
The American Position
The validity of Indian marriage law in the United States has
generally not been questioned by the American courts because of
their overall view of Indian law. That is, Indian nations are
regarded as having possessed their own inherent sovereignty, at
least over internal or domestic matters, since colonization began.
The judiciary has continually recognized the validity of Indian
law as governing all matters within Indian territories since the
decision of the New York State Supreme Court in 1810 in
Jackson ex dem. Gibert v. Wood." This approach has been
followed on numerous occasions in the United States with the
approval of the United States Supreme Court from as early as
1831.ss
54. 7 Johns. 290 (S. Ct. of N.Y.)(1810).
55. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). For a more detailed
discussion of this case and the general issue involved, see B. MORSE, INDIAN TRIBAL
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The American courts have, on occasion, had the opportunity
to consider the validity of Indian marriage law. The first such op-
portunity was in 1838 in Fisher v. Allen,56 where the primary'
issue involved a property dispute over the assignment of a slave as
payment of a debt by John Allen. The slave in question had been
owned by Allen's wife prior to their marriage and Chickasaw
customary law held that the husband did not acquire any interest
in his wife's property upon marriage. The Mississippi court up-
held the validity of Chickasaw law on marriage and matrimonial
property, leaving the wife free of her husband's debt and his in-
valid assignment.
Choctaw law on marriage and divorce at will was upheld a few
years later in Wall v. Williamson. 7 The wife, in this case, had
signed a promissory note which the plaintiff wished to collect
from her husband, the defendant. The court made its views on
traditional Indian law very clear when it stated:
The question yet remained, whether, at the time of this sup-
posed marriage, the laws and usages of the Choctaw tribe had
been abolished or superseded; or, whether they composed a
distinct community, governed by their own chiefs and laws. It
was not pretended, that any statute producing this effect was
then passed, and therefore, if lost at all, their local laws must
have been lost, in consequence of their living within the ter-
ritorial limits of the States. It may be difficult to ascertain the
precise period of time when one nation, or tribe, is swallowed
up by another, or ceases to exist; but until then, there cannot
be said to be a merger. It was only by positive enactments, even
in the case of conquered and subdued nations, that their laws
are changed by the conqueror. The mere acquisition, whether
by treaty or war produced no such effect. It may therefore be
considered, that the usages and customs of the Choctaw tribe
continued as their law, and governed their people, at the time
when this marriage was had. The consequence was, that if valid
by those customs, it was so recognized by our law. 8
In light of this opinion, the court upheld the validity of the mar-
riage and would have held the husband liable on the note except
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL FOR CANADA (Saskatoon: University of Saskat-
chewan Native Law Centre, 1980), at 3-7.
56. 2 Howard Rep. 611 (1838).
57. 8 Ala. 48, aff'd II Ala. 826 (1844).
58. Id. at 51.
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that the judge further recognized the Choctaw law of divorce at
will and applied it to this case, rendering the woman a femme
sole, and, hence, solely liable for her own debts.
This has also been the legal position in the United States
regarding mixed marriages that occurred according to customary
law. This first such case arose in Morgan v. McGhee," and this
view of the prevailing state of the law has generally been followed
ever since. 6°
The American position can, thus, be readily summarized by
stating that the general principle of the law of conflicts governing
the validity of marriages-namely, that if the marriage is in com-
pliance with the lex loci contractus, it is valid everywhere-is ap-
plicable to marriages which occur in accordance with Indian law
in Indian territory. This principle applies as a result of the re-
sidual Indian sovereignty that exists within any reservation in
which the tribal government retains and exercises this surviving
sovereignty. In addition, Indian customary law will govern all
other family matters involving Indians who are domiciled and
present on the reservation, unless the traditional law has been
superseded by recently enacted tribal law. Unfortunately, the
Canadian situation is not nearly as clear or as precise.
The Canadian Jurisprudence on Custom Marriages
The Colonial Situation
One of the most immediately striking factors in the response of
the Canadian judiciary to the traditional family law of the native
people of Canada is its general refusal to define it as "law" in the
first place. At best, the courts have referred to "Indian mar-
riages" or "custom marriages," whereas on other occasions this
institution has. been called "concubinage" or "cohabitation."
The approach, which is reflected by the wording chosen, is to
regard native marriages as being conducted pursuant to customs,
traditions, or practices, rather than according to law. This then
presents customary marriages as being somehow less important
and less durable than Christian marriages that meet modern legal
requirements developed in England.
59. 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 12 (1844).
60. Boyer v. Dively Administrator 58 Mo. Rep. 510 (1875); Raymond v. Raymond,
83 F. 721 (1897); Johnson v. Johnson's Administrator, 30 Mo. Rep. 72 (1860). For a brief
discussion of this particular issue, see H. Foster, Indian and Common Law Marriages, 3
Am. INDIAN L. REv. (1975).
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Only a handful of cases has come before the Canadian courts
concerning Indian or Inuit marriage law. Even fewer cases have
raised other aspects of customary family law for judicial con-
sideration. The paucity of judicial experience and the timing of
litigation, with the first Canadian case not arising until as late as
1854,61 may well be responsible for the general attitude of thejudiciary. It is interesting to note that this view of customary law
did not originally prevail in England or in North America.
Perhaps the best known early example of English opinion
toward marriages involving Indians relates to Princess Pocahon-
tas. The only negative thought concerning her marriage to John
Rolfe was the feeling that he, as a commoner, might be guilty of
treason in forming an alliance with the royal family of Chief
Powhaten, father of Pocahontas. Even this factor, however, did
not affect the warm reception she received at the royal court on
her visit to London in 1616.62
Thus, the initial position of England was not to interfere with
marriages between two Indians, and to favor marriages between
white colonists and the Indian inhabitants. William Cullen Bryant
states that, "Alliances by marriage between the whites and In-
dians were encouraged and were not infrequent, as it was hoped
to establish by such connections more friendly relations with the
savages [sic]." 3 The validity of these Indian marriages was never
questioned by the courts, regardless of where they occurred, as
long as they were pursuant to Indian customary practices.
It is important to remember that the many restrictions upon,
and preconditions for, valid marriages imposed by law today are
of fairly recent vintage." English marriage practices were once
very similar to those under Indian marriage law. "Informal"
marriages, or consensual marriages, in which a man and a woman
would simply define themselves as married through living
together in a conjugal relationship without a prior ceremony con-
ducted by a member of the clergy or the civil authorities, were the
61. Tranchemontagne v. Monteferrand (unrep., Oct. 27, 1854, Superior Court of
Lower Canada at Montreal, No. 286); referred to by Monk, J., in Connolly v. Woolrich
& Johnson, [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, at 249-50.
62. W. BRYANT, A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1876 ed.), at 303-304.
63. Id. at 305.
64. For a discussion of the history of marriage law in Europe, see Connolly v.
Woolrich and Johnson, [18671 11 L.C.J. 197, 215-24. For a more detailed treatment of
English marriage law, see J. JACKSON, THE FORMATION AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
(2d ed., London: Butterworth, 1969); and P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW, (5th ed., London:
Butterworths, 1969).
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general rule. The basic requirements for a valid consensual mar-
riage, or a contract of marriage per verba de praesenti, were that
it was a voluntary union for life of two people of the opposite sex
to the exclusion of all others involving public recognition as hus-
band and wife. 65 The Roman Catholic Church was the first to re-
quire formally a religious celebration under canon law as a
necessary precondition to a recognized marriage. This occurred
with the passage of the Decree Tametsi by the Council of Trent in
1563.1" Prior to this time, canon law merely indicated its
displeasure with informal marriages.
The Parliament of England did not move to restrict consensual
marriages, which are widely labeled today as "common law mar-
riages," until 1753. The common law position was thus altered by
the statute commonly called Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act.67
Even this change was expressly stated as not applying to Scotland
or the colonies, nor to the Quakers, Jewish people, or the royal
family.68 Subsequent English marriage statutes69 also had no ex-
traterritorial effect. Furthermore, imposing legislative re-
quirements on top of preexisting religious dogma was not fully
accepted and followed even in the nineteenth century, when the
London Times still carried market prices for wife sales.7"
Therefore, it is not surprising that consensual marriages be-
tween colonists and Indians, or among Indians alone, would not
be a subject for judicial consideration before the 1800s in Canada
or the United States.
The first Canadian court to be confronted with the question of
whether to recognize Indian marriage law was the Superior Court
of the Province of Canada in Montreal in 1854. As in many of
these cases, the dispute in Tranchemontagne v. Monteferrand"
65. The classic definition of a valid marriage in English law was stated by Lord Pen-
zance in Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 at 133, as follows: "I conceive that
marriage, as understood in christendom, may ... be defined as the voluntary union for
life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others."
66. Foster, supra note 60, at 85.
67. 26 Geo. II, c. 33.
68. Foster, supra note 60, at 85.
69. See, e.g., Marriage Act, 1823 (U.K.), C. 76 (11 Stats. 695); Marriage Act, 1824
(11 Stats. 706); Marriage Act, 1835 (11 Stats. 710); Marriage Act, 1836 (11 Stats. 711);
Marriage Act, 1840 (11 Stats. 726); Marriage Act, 1886 (11 Stats. 745); Marriage Act,
1898 (11 Stats. 758).
70. Mueller, Inquiry Into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. PiTr. L. REv. 545,
566-72 (1957).
71. Tranchemontagne v. Monteferrand (unrep., Oct. 27, 1854, Superior Court of
Lower Canada at Montreal, No. 286). This case has apparently escaped the notice of all
subsequent courts and commentators.
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concerned a property fight between the child of the customary
marriage on the one hand and a relative of the white male spouse
on the other.
Hugh Faris was married to his wife without any formal cere-
mony, according to Indian custom. She was described as a half-
blood or Mtis Indian, but her tribal affiliation was not men-
tioned. Their daughter's claim to the realty depended solely upon
her legitimacy and, hence, upon the validity of the marriage. The
court relied upon proof of prolonged cohabitation as well as
upon their public reputation as husband and wife to uphold the
marriage. Unfortunately, the case was never reported, and one is
left presuming the judgment to have been unanimous from the
three-member bench without knowing the reasons underlying the
court's decision.
Post-Confederation Canadian Law
The next case might well be regarded as the locus classicus in
the area. It has been continuously considered with the highest
respect in later decisions and has received international pro-
minence." The decision of Justice Monk in Connolly v. Woolrich
& Johnson 3 is indeed a "very able and exhaustive judgment." 4
William Connolly, a Roman Catholic who was born in Lower
Canada in 1786, went to Indian country as a clerk in the service
of the North West Company in 1802. He was initially located at
Riviere-aux-Rats (or Rat River) in the Rebaska (also called
Athabaska) region, which was 300 miles east of the Rockies and
1,200 miles west of the nearest settlement at Red River. In the
following year, he married Susanne, the daughter of the local
chief, according to Cree custom by which he gave presents to her
father to obtain his consent and hers. The granting of consent
and the giving of gifts were the sole constituents of Cree marriage
law, which required no formal ceremony to validate the marriage,
although celebrations and marriage feasts were common.
In 1832 he married Julia Woolrich, his second cousin, without
obtaining a divorce from Susanne and while she was present in
Montreal. This second marriage subsisted until his death in 1849.
72. For example, see the comments of Foster, supra note 60, at 95; and those of W.
Beckett, The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages under English Law, 48 L.Q.R. 341,
349, 353, (1932). The case is appended in summary form at 369-73.
73. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd, [1869] 1 R.L. 253.
74. The Queen v. Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka, [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211, 213 (per Wetmore, J.
on behalf of the court).
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Susanne continued to receive financial support until her death in
1862, first from William, and, after his death, from Julia, even
though in his will he had left his entire estate to his second wife
and their two children.
The plaintiff, son of Susanne, asserted his right to a one-sixth
interest (as there were six children) in his mother's estate, which,
he argued, comprised primarily one-half of William Connolly's
estate. The son argued that his father was domiciled in Lower
Canada throughout his life, that there was no marriage contract
between his parents, that the marriage according to Cree law was
valid and was to be recognized in the Canadian courts, and,
therefore, that the community of property regime in existence in
Lower Canada applied, giving rise to his mother's one-half share
in his father's estate.
Justice Monk was confronted with a wide variety of technical
and substantive legal issues in addition to the difficult task of
reconstructing an accurate picture of the conditions existing more
than sixty years earlier and thousands of miles to the west of
Montreal.
Justice Monk examined subsequent developments in the
region, and in general, in terms of French and English activities
that might have changed this legal picture, but he found the
original situation unaltered, with the Cree law subsisting intact.
The court was, then, of the view that Cree law governed the mar-
riage rather than the common law and, therefore, that he was not
bound by any English decisions. In order to buttress further the
correctness of his decision, he canvassed Roman and canon law,
civil law, and the law of England concerning consensual mar-
riages. His opinion was that all European law recognized the con-
tract of marriage per verba de praesenti in this type of situation.
The only difficulty he encountered was the majority decision of
the Court of Queen's Bench of Ireland in the The Queen v.
Millis, 71 which held a contract of marriage per verba de praesenti
to be a binding contract but not to constitute a complete marriage
in the absence of a religious ceremony. This decision was af-
firmed by the House of Lords as a result of an equal division
among the six law lords who heard the appeal.76 Monk, J.,
asserted that the decision was wrong in law and impractical in
75. [1843-44] 10 CI. and F. 534; 8 E.R. 844 at 888.
76. [1843-44] 10 Cl. and F. 699; 8 E.R. 844 at 905. JACKSON, note 64, supra, at 221,
says that the majority viev "had no historical justification whatsoever" and that it has
been confined as far as possible and restricted to England and Ireland only.
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theory as it would have the effect of prohibiting marriages in
remote areas, like in Athabaska in 1803.
In Justice Monk's opinion, the law of conflicts principle
relating to the recognition of foreign marriages would apply.
Under the rule of lex loci contractus, in which all nations will ac-
cept the validity of a marriage that conforms to the local law of
the country of domicile of the parties or the place where the
celebration occurs,77 compliance with Cree marriage law is the
deciding factor, even where only one of the parties is Cree, as no
distinction on that point had been created. Justice Monk con-
cluded his comments on Indian law and the British response to it
by stating:
There is besides, one answer to all this, and a very plain one.
1st, The supreme authority of the empire, in not abolishing or
altering the Indian law, and allowing it to exist for one hun-
dred years, impliedly sanctioned it, and 2nd, The sovereign
power in these matters, by proclamation has tacitly
acknowledged these laws and usages of the Indians to be in
force, and so long as they are in force as a law in any part of
the British empire or elsewhere, this Court must acknowledge
and enforce them.
This Indian custom or usage is, as regards the jurisdiction of
this Court, a foreign law of marriage; but it obtains within the
territories and possessions of the Crown of England, and until
it is altered, I cannot disregard it. It is competent-it has been
competent during the last hundred years, for the parliament of
Great Britain to abrogate those Indian laws, and to substitute
others for them. It has not thought proper to do so, and I shall
not.7"
On the basis of these conclusions on points of law, the court
regarded the plaintiff as legitimate and eligible for a share in his
mother's estate. The community of property regime of Lower
Canada governed the matrimonial property and decided this issue
as William's domicile was always Lower Canada. Thus, the law
77. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, 243-49, aff'd [1869] 1 R.L. 253. Marriage law was gov-
erned by the lex loci celebrations in England until the decision in Scottomayer v. De Bar-
ros, (1877), 3 P.D. I (C.A.), in which the Court of Appeal modified the law so that
capacity to marry is determined by the parties' lex loci domicilii while the formalities to
be observed are those required by the lex loci celebrations. This distinction would not
have affected the validity of the union between William and Susanne.
78. Id. at 249.
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from different jurisdictions applied to the different legal issues
because of the distinction between the status of the marriage and
the consequences which flowed from it." ' Therefore, the plaintiff
was awarded a one-twelfth part of his father's estate, on account-
ing of the revenue created by the estate since his father's death,
and costs.
This was not, however, the end of the matter. The case was ap-
parently inscribed for consideration by the Court of Review of
Quebec, but was withdrawn and an appeal was taken instead to
the Court of Queen's Bench (Court of Appeal). 0 A full five-
member bench heard the appeal and dismissed it, with Justice
Loranger dissenting.
This case was not quite over after the appeal was dismissed, as
the defendant Johnson then launched an appeal to the Privy
Council. Leave to appeal was granted, causing Connolly to move
for the provision by the appellant of new security. This motion
was granted on March 9, 1871, by the Court of Queen's Bench."'
Julia Woolrich's will was also at this time the subject of further
litigation. 2 It appears that the appeal to the Privy Council was
ultimately abandoned,83 leaving the Queen's Bench decision un-
disturbed.
The next opportunity for Canadian courts to consider these
issues arose in very similar circumstances to the Connolly case. 4
Once again, the distribution of the assets of an estate of a white
male from Lower Canada, who also had been associated with the
North West Company in various posts in western Canada for
many years, was called into question by a descendent of the tes-
tator, Alexander Fraser, and an Indian woman by the name of
Angelique Meadows. He had moved to the west in 1788 as part of
his employment with the North West Company and remained
there until 1801. During this period he fathered three children by
Angelique, whom he had allegedly married in accordance with
the Indian law of her unknown tribe. It appeared that this mar-
79. Id. at 258-63.
80. This is according to Cross, J., sitting as a member of the Court of Queen's
Bench in Jones v. Fraser, [1886] S.C.R. 327 at 355. Justice Cross was the counsel of
record for the defendants in Connolly v. Woolrich at trial and on appeal and, therefore,
referred to his recollection to correct an apparent inaccuracy in the report of the appeal of
the Connolly case, at [1869] 1 R.L. 253, at 253, which indicated that the Court of Review
also had decided in favor of the Indian marriage.
81. [1872] 16 L.C.J. 100.
82. [1872] 16 L.C.J. 329 (Q.B.).
83. See note 80, supra.
84. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd, [1869] 1 R.L. 253.
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riage occurred sometime in 1788, or early 1789, as the first child
of this union was born on December 24, 1789, rendering eyewit-
ness evidence impossible in litigation commencing in 1881. In ad-
dition, there were no members of the clergy in this part of the
Northwest Territories (or Indian Country as it was then called)
until 1817. Therefore, it was impossible for this marriage to be
recorded in any civil marriage registers, or to have been celebra-
ted by a priest or minister.
Alexander Fraser returned to Lower Canada in 1801, accom-
panied by Ang~lique and by their three children, who were bap-
tized within the year in the presence of Alexander and with the
surname of Fraser. The baptismal certificates were available to
the court, but they did not expressly state that the children-were
legitimate, or that the parents were married.
The family settled together in his home at his estate in Rivi~re-
du-Loup. After an unknown period of time, he erected a small
house near his own as a residence for Ang~lique and the children,
to which he would pay frequent visits. Subsequently, he moved to
another estate of his where he developed a lengthy relationship
with one of his servants, Pauline Michaud, who gave him five
more children, all of whom were known as illegitimate but who
bore his name. Alexander continued to support and visit Ang6li-
que until her death in 1833. There were, however, conflicts in the
evidence as to the status of Angblique. Several witnesses testified
that she was known as Madame Fraser, the wife of Alexander,
and that she had been introduced in such fashion by him, while
other witnesses denied this. There was, however, some further
evidence that she had previously been married to one Letang
without any clear proof that the marriage had been dissolved, or
that he had died prior to her marriage with Fraser.
Fraser made his will in 1833, in which he divided his estate
primarily among his children, but gave a bequest of an annuity to
this woman as "Ang6lique Meadows." Furthermore, upon her
death, she was buried in a Roman Catholic cemetery in St.
Patrice, whose register recorded her solely as "Ang6lique,
sauvage, native des pays du Nord-Ouest." The evidence support-
ing a valid marriage conducted in accordance with Indian law and
recognized as such by Ang6lique and Alexander was shaky at
best.
The litigation was focused upon the effects of intervening
events between the making of the will in 1833 and his death in
1837. During this four-year interval, Fraser sold two of his
seigniories for the sum of £15,000 to pay his pressing debts,
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which amounted to £5,400, with the balance being invested.
These seigniories formed the specific bequest in his will to his
daughters of both relationships and, thus, their sale was the sub-
ject of a dispute as to whether the sale had revoked the legacy
and over what should happen to the balance of the proceeds. The
original executors of the estate had apportioned and distributed
the £9,600 in 1839 to all the heirs upon their clear agreement on
the basis of the amount of total land in the estate allotted to
each.
Some forty years then passed before one of the sons of Alex-
ander and his servant Pauline (William Fraser) sued the subse-
quent curator for an accounting in respect of the way in which
the £9,600 was distributed. Angelique's grandson, Thomas
Jones, was joined as a defendant. The case, Fraser v. Pouliot,5
was heard before Chief Justice Meredith of the Superior Court of
Quebec in 1881. The primary issue before the court for deter-
mination involved the alleged revocation by virtue of the sale of
the legacy in favor of the plaintiff.
Justice Ramsay apparently delivered the primary judgment" in
the subsequent appeal in which he denied the validity of the mar-
riage strictly on the basis that the evidence necessary to prove the
marriage was lacking. After deciding that the doctrine of res
judicata did not apply, he went on to say that there was no dis-
pute in law concerning the possession d'etat from which a legally
valid marriage may be presumed, namely, name, treatment, and
repute. The problem was that there was no evidence in this case
of the relevant tribal marriage law or even as to whether the mar-
riage had in fact occurred in accordance with it. Furthermore, ac-
cording to Justice Ramsay, Quebec law presumably governed the
marriage because no different law was pleaded by the respond-
ent.87 He was willing, possibly, to accept the validity of a consen-
sual marriage; however, the evidence available only proved pro-
longed cohabitation, but did not establish that the parties regarded
this as a marital union for life." He stated: "Nor am I prepared
85. [1881] 7 Q.L.R. 149.
86. Jones v. Fraser, [18861 12 Q.L.R. 327, 343-54. Justice Cross, the former counsel
of Woolrich in Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd, [1869] 1 R.L. 253,
delivered a separate and shorter judgment at 354-61. Dorion, C.J., and Baby, J., con-
curred without reasons, but it is unclear from the law of reports which of the two
judgments they adopted.
87. [18861 12 Q.L.R. 327, 349. However, Justice Monk took a different view on this
point at 333-36.
88. Id. at 349-50.
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to accept the proposition that the cohabitation of a civilized man
and a savage woman . ..gives rise to a presumption that they
had consented to be married in our sense of marriage.""
Ramsay, J., thought the testimony lacked the substance nec-
essary to prove that Angelique took Alexander's last name and
was known as his wife. The presence of separate houses, of a
subsequent mistress, and of the way she was named in the will
and the baptismal certificates all tended to repudiate this claim.
Therefore, the Connolly case9" could be "very easily distin-
guished" '91 on the facts. Justice Ramsay clearly was dismayed that
the distribution agreement of 1839, "un partage," could be chal-
lenged after forty years by someone who had continually
benefited financially from it.92
The actual court order in the case most closely resembles the
views of Justice Ramsay and it is fairly safe to suggest that his
opinion was the majority judgment.
Justice Monk also participated in the appeal and agreed with
the majority on all points except the validity of the marriage. He
was prepared to rely upon the evidence concerning Indian mar-
riage practices submitted in the former case and apply it to this
one. In addition, he believed that the legal presumptions in favor
of the validity of marriages and the legitimacy of children should
be used by the court here as they were before in Connolly v.
Woolrich & Johnson,93 especially when no subsequent marriage
was celebrated. He was unwilling to infer that the parties ac-
cepted polygamous marriages or divorce at will just because they
were possible under some tribal laws. Simply put, he viewed the
evidence as sufficient, if viewed in a positive light, and the law as
being settled in support of the respondent's claim.
This decision was then appealed by Jones to the Supreme
Court of Canada where it was unanimously dismissed. 4
The next case to call Indian marriage law into question was
The Queen v. Nan-e-quis-a-ka,9" which involved the admissibility
of evidence from the wife of a man charged with assault causing
bodily harm.. The accused called two Indian women as witnesses
in his defense at trial, both of whom were stated to be his wives.
89. Id. at 350.
90. [18671 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd, [18691 1 R.L. 253.
91. [18861 12 Q.L.R. 327, 354.
92. Id. at 352-54.
93. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, affd, [1869] 1 R.L. 253.
94. Jones v. Fraser, [1886] 13 S.C.R. 342; 12 Q.L.R. 327, 367 et seq.
95. [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T. C.A.).
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The trial judge heard the evidence of Maggie concerning her mar-
riage for life to the accused, which was the first for either. He
concluded that this marriage was legally valid and that she was
then neither competent nor compellable as a witness for her hus-
band. The evidence of the second wife was admitted and the trial
continued, resulting in Nan-e-quis-a-ka's conviction. Justice Wet-
more reserved for the opinion of the Court en banc the correct-
ness of his ruling in excluding the evidence of Maggie.
The issue was subsequently argued before a five-member bench
and the judgment in support of the ruling was delivered by
Justice Wetmore. He adopted the reasoning of Justice Monk in
the Connolly case 96 that Indian law governed marriages prior to
the reception of English law in the Northwest Territories on July
15, 1870. Therefore, a marriage conducted in compliance with
customary law prior to that date was valid. 97 After noting the
legislation that introduced English civil and criminal law into the
territories, and the limitation that this occurred only so far as
English law was applicable, 98 he went on to say:
In the first place are the laws of England respecting the solem-
nization of marriage applicable to these Territories quoad the
Indian population? I have great doubts if these laws are ap-
plicable to the Territories in any respect. According to these
laws marriages can be solemnized only at certain times and in
certain places or buildings. These times would be in many cases
most inconvenient here and the buildings, if they exist at all,
are often so remote from the contracting parties that they
could not be reached without the greatest inconvenience. I am
satisfied however that these laws are not applicable to the Ter-
ritories quoad the Indians. The Indians are for the most part
unchristianized; they yet adhere to their own peculiar marriage
custom and usages. It would be monstrous to hold that the law
of England respecting the solemnization of marriage is applic-
able to them. I know of no Act of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom or of Canada, except as hereinafter stated, which af-
fects in any way these customs or usages. The Ordinance
respecting Marriage, chapter 29 Revised Ordinances (1888)
does not in my opinion affect the question. The conclusion I
have arrived at is that a marriage between Indians by mutual
96. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd, [18691 1 R.L. 253.
97. [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211, 212-14 (N.W.T. C.A.).
98. Id. at 214-15, quoting from The Northwest Territories Act R.S.C. 1886, C. 50,
S. II.
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consent and according to Indian custom since 15th July, 1870,
is a valid marriage, providing that neither of the parties had a
husband or wife, as the case might be, living at the time; at any
rate so as to render either one, as a general rule, incompetent
and not compellable to give evidence against the other on trial
charged with an indictable offence. 99
Justice Wetmore viewed a number of provisions in the Indian
Act' which refer to the terms "wife," "widow," or "child" as
amounting to a statutory recognition of customary marriages.'10
For these reasons he was of the view that the first marriage was
legally valid and the wife's evidence was properly excluded. It is
implicit in this judgment that the second "wife" did not have this
same legal status, as there was no question about her testimony
being inadmissible.
The Common Pleas Division of the Ontario High Court of
Justice had the next opportunity to deal with a case involving a
custom marriage. Robb v. Robb °2 was another estate case con-
cerning the legacy of John Robb. His will left most of his estate
to his son William George Robb and his heirs, unless William
died unmarried without legal issue, in which case it would go to
the plaintiff, John's widow and executrix. The son moved to
British Columbia in 1869, where he married a chief's daughter,
Supul-Catle, of the Comox Tribe. This marriage complied with
Comox law, as it involved a gift to the chief (the bride-price),
followed by a feast in celebration of the marriage, with further
presents to her family. The couple then cohabited as spouses and
were so regarded until her death, at which time Robb returned to
Ontario with his surviving daughter, the infant defendant Sarah.
He cared for his daughter, continually spoke of her as his legit-
imate child, and repeatedly stated that he was legally married to
her mother. The testator died in 1886 followed by William two
years later. Sarah claimed her father's estate through intestacy,
which included the portion left to him under John Robb's will.
Justice Robertson distinguished the trial judgment in Connolly
v. Woolrich,' °3 which he called "celebrated" and "entitled to the
greatest respect,"'0 4 on the basis that conditions in British Col-
99. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
100. R.S.C. 1886, c. 43, SS. 9, 12, 13, 20, 88, 90 and 93; as amended, S.C. 1887, c.
33. S. 9.
101. [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T. C.A.).
102. [1891] 20 O.R. 591.
103. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, affd, [1869] 1 R.L. 253.
104. [1891] 20 O.R. 591, 595.
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umbia in 1869 were considerably different from those in Atha-
baska in 1803, in that British Columbia had members of the cler-
gy and its own colonial government with magistrates. He felt able
to infer that there had been a valid Christian marriage from
William's repeated statements that they were legally married in
the same manner as if it had occurred in Ontario. Therefore, he
could rely upon the legal presumptions in favor of validity, in
conjunction with the evidence about consent, reputation,
cohabitation, and consummation, to declare it to be a proper
marriage, without having to consider its validity as a custom mar-
riage under Indian law. The court did state, however, that the
custom marriage would be valid as a consensual marriage, or
sponsolia per verba de praesenti, under English law. I5 Sarah was
declared the legitimate heir of her father and, as such, was enti-
tled to take his share of John's estate.
The next case was based on events also arising in British Col-
umbia, but it is a far less satisfactory judgment.106 Local Judge
Bole was confronted by a lawsuit in which the plaintiff sued as
mother and sole next of kin of her son, who had died intestate.
She was a Cowichan Indian who had married John Schmidt in
1868 in accordance with the customs of her tribe. They lived
together until his death in 1890 and were blessed with one son
who received all of his father's property under John's will. The
son subsequently died in 1892, unmarried and without any issue,
causing the official administrator to seize his property. The plain-
tiff's claim rested strictly upon the legality of her marriage, a
claim that was rejected by the court. Unfortunately, the report of
the decision is only two paragraphs long and contains no reasons.
It appears from the factual summary that the court was of the
view that the colonial law in existence at the time of the marriage
required a Christian ceremony, which was alleged to be readily
available to the parties. Since none of the leading cases in this
area were cited by the court,"0 7 it can be submitted that this case
is of little weight.
This decision was followed the next year by The Queen v.
"Bear's Shin Bone, "10 in which the defendant was charged
under the Criminal Code with practicing polygamy. He was a
Blood Indian who had married two women of the same tribe ac-
105. Id. at 599-602.
106. Smith v. Young, [1898] 34 Can. L.J. 581 (B.C.S.C.).
107. The only case cited was Aronegary v. Vaigalie, 6 A.C. 364, which was
distinguished.
108. [1898-1901] 4 Terr. L.R. 173 (1900), 3 C.C.C. 329 (N.W.T.S.C.).
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cording to customary law. This judgment also receives only one
paragraph in the law reports in which it is indicated that Justice
Rouleau convicted Bear's Shin Bone of the charge by holding In-
dian marriages to be valid pursuant to R. v. Nan-e-quis-a-ka.'09
The same court was confronted by another estate case in the
same year in Re Sheran. "0 Sheran had moved to the Northwest
Territories in 1874 and settled down with a Piegan Indian woman
in 1878, having two children before his death intestate four years
later. Mary Brown and he had promised each other that they
were husband and wife for life and that neither would have any
other spouse. After the christening' of their first child, Sheran
promised that they would get married in "the white man's way,"
but this never did occur. Although members of the clergy resided
or traveled through the area, Sheran was a Roman Catholic and
no priests were available to conduct the ceremony. Since it was
admitted by counsel for the children, who sought to enjoy their
father's estate, that there had been no customary marriage, the
court dealt solely with the case as one involving consensual mar-
riage.
Justice Scott considered the evidence and found it wanting in
proving a valid marriage per verba de praesenti. He further relied
upon R. v. Millis' in deciding that the marriage was invalid. The
exceptions to this latter case were considered and rejected as the
court did not regard the territories as a "strictly barbarous coun-
try" I2 in 1878, or one where a religious ceremony was impossible
for British subjects. The Connolly"3 and Robb"4 cases were
readily distinguished on the facts. The net result was that the
marriage was held invalid and the children illegitimate, leaving
Sheran's sister as the only lawful heir. It is worth noting that im-
plicit in the judgment is the indication that the law is different for
a marriage involving at least one British subject from one be-
tween two native people.
The decision in Smith v. Young ' appears to have been fol-
lowed in another case in British Columbia in 1906, which has
109. [18891 1 Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T. C.A.). Mr. Justice Rouleau concurred with
Wetmore, J., in that decision.
110. [1898-1901] 4 Terr. L.R. 83 (N.W.T.S.C.).
111. [1843-44] 10 Cl. and F. 534; 8 E.R. 844 at 888. See also note 76, supra.
112. [1898-1901] 4 Terr. L.R. 83, 91 (N.W.T.S.C.).
113. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd, [1869] 1 R.L. 253.
114. [1891] 20 O.R. 591.
115. Smith v. Young, [1898] 34 Can. L.J. 581 (B.C.S.C.).
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never been reported.11 6 A male Indian had been charged with
bigamy for having a second custom marriage after divorcing his
first wife according to Indian law. The Chief Justice directed the
jury to acquit the accused after holding that custom marriages
were not marriages at all within the meaning of the term in the
criminal law. 111
Fifteen years passed before the next court case118 arose in
which the validity of Indian marriage laws was raised in a manner
similar to that in R. v. Nan-e-quis-a-ka.1 9 Justice Gregory was
presiding over a murder trial in which the defense objected to the
Crown's attempt to call Jennie Williams as a witness. The defense
counsel argued that she was neither a competent nor a com-
pellable witness as she was the wife of the accused. Testimony
was received on the marriage and divorce by redemption laws of
the Kwakiutl Indians of British Columbia, as the accused had
been married and divorced according to these laws twice before
this customary marriage to Jennie. After hearing legal argument
based upon R. v. Nan-e-quis-a-ka20 and Bethell v. Hillyard,12 ,
the court rendered the following brief judgment excluding the
evidence:
I do not think the evidence is admissible, but I think the Crown
should ask for a case stated. The matter is one of great impor-
tance and should be authoritatively settled. I cannot, in the
middle of an assize, and in the middle of the case give the ques-
tion the consideration which it should have.122
It appears that the Crown did not follow this suggestion, as no
further decision was ever reported.
These issues were canvassed once more in British Columbia by
the Court of Appeal in Yew v. Attorney General,I23 only this time
in relation to a polygamous marriage celebrated in China. The
five-member court unanimously reversed the B.C. Supreme Court
116. The unnamed decision is referred to in a letter dated July 7, 1906, from the
Deputy Attorney General of B.C. to an Indian agent, reproduced in SANDERS, supra note
34, at n. 550 of chapter 2.
117. Id.
118. Rex v. Williams, [1921] 30 B.C.R. 303 (B.C.S.C.).
119. [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T. C.A.).
120. Id.
121. [1888] 38 Ch. D. 220. For an interesting contemporary comment on this case in
relation to Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, see Pagan Marriage, 8 CAN. LAW
TIMES 132 (1888).
122. Rex v. Williams, [1921] 30 B.C.R. 303, 305 (B.C.S.C.).
123. [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1166; 33 B.C.R. 109 (B.C.C.A.).
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and held the marriages to be valid for the purposes of exempting
the deceased from succession duties. Three judgments were deliv-
ered in which each considered the pertinent case law, including
Justice Monk's decision in Connolly v. Woolrich. 24 Martin,
J.A., specifically stated that it was rightly decided and "should
not be lightly disturbed,""'2 while Justice McPhillips also fol-
lowed it by declaring that it was "a most erudite judgement
which has stood unchallenged and unreversed for half a century
and more."' 26
These issues remained dormant, at least as far as the legislators
and the courts were concerned, for forty years until the arrival of
Re Noah Estate,'27 which was a case of first impression in
Canada regarding Inuit marriage law. Noah had died on Christ-
mas Day of 1959 in a fire at a DEW-line site where he worked.
He left a small estate, comprised primarily of an insurance policy,
and was survived by his wife and daughter. He had married Igah
according to the Inuit customary law requirement of a trial mar-
riage, obtaining parental approval, and a public wedding celebra-
tion to notify the whole community of this new union. Letters of
administration of the estate were granted to the public admin-
istrator of the Eastern Arctic in the normal fashion by the Ter-
ritorial Court before Ottawa intervened to test the effect of a
1960 amendment to the Northwest Territories Act.' This
amendment was designed to render all laws of general application
in the territories applicable to "Eskimos."
The Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources
sent an agent from Ottawa to Frobisher Bay armed with a memo-
randum of argument to advise the court not to travel to the
deceased's community. After Justice Sissons stated that he was
going anyway, the agent submitted a further argument. Both
arguments were described by the trial judge in his memoirs in
these graphic terms 29 :
"It was an insult to the court, to the dead man, his wife and
child, and to the entire Eskimo race .... The supplementary
argument was simply indecent fantasy, born of ignorance and
arrogance. Book dealers have been prosecuted for having on
124. [18671 11 L.C.J. 197, affd, [18691 1 R.L. 253.
125. [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1166, 1184.
126. Id. at 1191.
127. [1961] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N.W.T.T.C.).
128. R.S.C. 1950, C. 331, § 17 as amended by S.C. 1960, c. 20, § 2.
129. [1961] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N.W.T.T.C.).
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their shelves material less obscene . . . . This was utterly
monstrous. It was crass, cruel, smug and sly .... I was quoted as
saying that no Ottawa bastard was going to tell me ten thousand
Eskimos were bastards, and though I'm not sure I said it, it
would have expressed my sentiments."' 3 I
The basic position of the federal government was that Inuit
marriages were only valid if performed in keeping with Christian
requirements; otherwise they were simply the voluntary liaison of
"paramours" and "concubines." The government's perceptions
of Inuit practices and morals were clearly disputed by the evi-
dence at trial. 3 ' Justice Sissons had no difficulty, in light of the
extensive evidence given concerning Inuit marriage practices, in
finding that Noah and Igah had complied with the requirements
of Inuit law. The more controversial issues were whether Inuit
law was recognized at English common law and what was the
consequence of the enactment of the Marriage Ordinance.'32
Sissons, J., briefly traced the old common law position regard-
ing consensual marriages, which simply required consent, per-
manence, and exclusivity from members of the opposite sex in
order to be valid.'33 The pre-1870 English marriage legislation
was only summarily examined, commencing with Lord Hardwicke's
Marriage Act, 3 4 because these enactments were expressly limited
to England and Ireland and, therefore, were not part of the law
received by the Northwest Territories on July 15, 1870. Thus, he
was able to conclude that Inuit customary marriages were
recognized as valid in the territories, prior to 1870 and subse-
quent thereto, subject to any federal legislative change.' Justice
Sissons was further of the view that the Marriage Ordinance 36
had not altered the common law concerning consensual and
native custom marriages, but rather had created a solemnization
process which did not invalidate marriages that suffered from ir-
130. J. SISSONS, JUDGE OF THE FAR NORTH (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd.,
1973), at 134-36.
131. [1961] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N.W.T.T.C.).
132. R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 64.
133. [1961] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185, 197-98 (N.W.T.T.C.). For this determination he
relied upon the American authorities of Fisher v. Fisher, 165 N.E. 140 (1929) and 55
C.J.S. 816-18.
134. 1753, 26 Geo. II, c. 33.
135. [1967] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185, 199 (N.W.T.T.C.). In doing so, he relied upon and
adapted the principles of several of the Indian customary marriage cases from CanadE
and the United States.
136. R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 64.
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regularities or defects in form. Therefore, since that ordinance
had not invalidated the marriage, then the 1960 amendment'
making the general law applicable to the Inuit could not affect
the status of the marriage either.' 38 On the basis of this decision,
the court proceeded to order the distribution of the estate equally
between widow and child, pursuant to the Intestate Succession
Ordinance.' 39 Justice Sissons felt that the latter ordinance did not
apply to Indians because of the specific sections in the Indian
Act '4 dealing with estates, nor to the Inuit in general as a result
of Inuit customary law. He applied it nonetheless to Noah's
estate with the rationale that Inuit succession law was not clearly
known to the court, and this law had neither experience in con-
veying money from a deceased's estate nor in applying to some-
one who had left his community to join the labor force.
The last reported case, 4' Exparte Cote,' 2 arose in Saskatche-
wan ten years later in a similar situation to Rex v. Williams' 3 and
Regina v. Nan-e-quis-a-ka.' " Wilfred Severight was on trial for a
criminal offense when the Crown called Barbara Ann Cote as a
witness. She refused to testify against the accused on the ground
that he was her lawful husband, thereby making her neither a
competent nor a compellable witness. Both were treaty Indians
who had decided to live together for life as husband wife in 1967,
after obtaining their parents' approval. They had no intention of
going through any other form of marriage as they were already
recognized, on the reserve and by the local Anglican minister, as
husband and wife.
The provincial magistrate rejected the contention that they
were lawfully married and found her in contempt of court for
refusing to testify. An application for a writ of habeas corpus ad
137. R.S.C. 1950, C. 331, § 17, as amended by S.C. 1960, c. 20, § 2.
138. [19611 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185, 203-204 (N.W.T.T.C.). This conclusion, although
right in law, was weakened somewhat by the court's reliance upon the mischief rule of
statutory interpretation and the Canadian Bill of Rights.
139. R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 53.
140. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6 §§ 45-50.
141. There is, however, a reference to a "Chipaway" (sic) case in 1973 or 1974 in
which the Alberta courts viewed customary marriage of an Indian couple from the North-
west Territories who had moved to that province, as invalid in Corrigan, A Note on
Canadian Indian Marriage Law, 4 W. CAN. J. ANTHRO, 17, 22 (1974). This is partictlarly
surprising in light of the curative provision in the Marriage Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 266, s.
23.
142. [1971] 22 D.L.R. (3d) 353 (Sask. C.A.), revs'g [1971] 4 W.W.R. 308; 19 D.L.R.
(3d) 486; 3 C.C.C. (2d) 383 (Sask. Q.B.).
143. SANDERS, supra note 34, n.550, ch. 2.
144. [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T. C.A.).
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subjiciendum was made before the Queen's Bench, " ' which was
granted on the basis that it was a valid marriage at common law.
Although the court referred to the Williams,1 46 Nan-e-quis-a-ka,47
and Noah Estate48 cases, it appears that Justice MacDonald did
not have the benefit of extensive argument or evidence on the
distinction between native custom marriages and the so-called
"common law marriages" which happen to involve native
people. 49
The decision was unanimously reversed by the Court of Ap-
peal' as it regarded the case strictly as one in which a couple had
entered a permanent and exclusive matrimonial relationship
without proper solemnization, rather than as a customary mar-
riage. Justice Maguire, speaking for the court, stated the follow-
ing as a relevant fact: "There was no evidence as to any Indian
custom of marriage, and thus marriage, according to the custom,
is not a factor. I will not consider the validity of such a
marriage."'51 Therefore, the court only mentioned two of the
cases involving native people discussed herein, namely, the
Robb' 2 and Connolly 3 cases (only the trial judgment of the lat-
ter case was mentioned by the court, with an improper citation in
the Dominion Law Reports version and the statement that it was
not available for their perusal).
Justice Maguire reasoned that the only issue before the court
was whether these facts constituted a valid marriage under the
English common law that was received by Saskatchewan in 1870.
He felt it was not necessary to consider the effect of the Marriage
Act'54 in light of his negative conclusion on the first point and
Cote's admission of noncompliance with the statute. He distin-
guished all the cases cited by counsel' which supported the ap-
145. Exparte Cote, [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 383.
146. SANDERS. supra note 34, n.550, ch. 2.
147. [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T.C.A.).
148. [1961] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N.W.T.T.C.).
149. Exparte Cote, [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 383, 384-86.
150. Exparte Cote, [1971] 22 D.L.R. (3d) 353; Regina v. Cote, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 737.
151. Id. at 355.
152. [1891] 20 O.R. 591.
153. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd,[1869] I R.L. 253. It has been cited as [1867] 11 U.C.
J. 197 instead of [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197.
154. R.S.S. 1965, c. 338.
155. Reference re R. v. Coffin, [1956] S.C.R. 191; (sub nom; Coffin v. The Queen),
[1955] 21 C.R. 333; Hyde v. Hyde & Woodmansee, (1866), L.R.I.P. & D. 130; Doe d.
Breakey v. Breakey, [1846] 2 U.C.Q.B. 349; and Blanchett v. Hansell [1944] 1 D.L.R.
799; aff'g, [1944] 1 D.L.R. 21.
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plicant's position, with the exception of R. v. Millis"5 6 and its
subsequent confirmation in England in Merker v. Merker.'17 It is
unfortunate that the Court of Appeal did not examine more
closely the limits of that case, and the legislation upon which it
was based, nor consider more fully the pertinent Canadian case
law. It is realistic to submit that this case is wrongly decided on
the narrow issue posed. Further, the brief description in the
judgments of the evidence given at trial seems to indicate that the
couple had, in fact, complied with the simple marriage formalities
required in the customary laws of the Indians of Saskatchewan. I
Many of these twelve Inuit and Indian cases that have been
canvassed at length are clearly inadequate. Two of the decisions
give no reasons at all in rejecting custom marriages, 59 while three
more give only brief ones in upholding them.'16 Ex parte Cote'6'
and Re Sheran6 1 are decided on a noncustom basis, while the
court preferred a similar approach in Robb v. Robb'63 although
implicit in the judgment is the approval of Indian marriage law.
The remaining four do seriously consider the validity of native
marriage law. In Jones v. Fraser,'64 the appellate courts viewed
the evidence as insufficient to establish the existence of a valid
marriage under customary law, or chose not to comment on this
point.'65 This case simply cannot be regarded as a rejection of In-
dian traditional family law. Indian and Inuit custom marriages
were strongly upheld on solid legal principles in the Connolly, 66
Nan-e-quis-a-ka,'67 and Noah Estate6 1 cases.
Therefore, six cases directly support the validity of native mar-
riage law and two more do so indirectly, while only two decisions
156. See notes 86 and 87, supra.
157. [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1389.
158. For a brief discussion of Dakota marriage law, see Corrigan, supra note 185, at
19-21.
159. Smith v. Young, [1898] 34 Can. L.J. 581 (B.C.S.C.), and the case referred to in
note 116, supra.
160. Tranchemontagne v. Monteferrand (unrep., Oct. 27, 1854, Superior Court of
Lower Canada at Montreal, No. 286); R. v. Bear's Shin Bone, [1898-1901] 4 Terr. L.R.
173 (1900), 3 C.C.C. 329 (N.W.T.S.C.); Rex v. Williams, [1921] 30 B.C.R. 303
(B.C.S.C.).
161. [1971] 22 D.L.R. (3d) 353 (Sask. C.A.), rev'g [1971] 4 W.W.R. 308.
162. [1898] 4 Terr. L.R. 83 (N.W.T.S.C.).
163. [1891] 20 O.R. 591.
164. [1886] 12 Q.L.R. 327.
165. See the discussion on this case in the text, infra.
166. [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, aff'd, [1869] 1 R.L. 253.
167. [1889] 1 Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T.C.A.).
168. [1961] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N.W.T.T.C.).
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given without reasons from British Columbia take the contrary
position. Both of these latter cases must be viewed as bad law in
light of the statements made by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Yew v. Attorney General.'69 It is not completely possi-
ble, however, to assert the present validity of Indian and Inuit
marriage laws without a binding ruling on the issue from the
Supreme Court of Canada, or an abundance of supporting deci-
sions from the appellate courts across the country. The cases on
point are largely from the last century and emanate solely from
Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, and the Northwest Territo-
ries. Only the Noah Estates7 ' decision sustains Inuit custom mar-
riages, and there are no reported cases at all on Indian
longhouse' 7' and Mtis marriages. One can neither look to the
present Indian Act' 72 for a resolution to this problem, nor to
DIAND for a consistent and well-defined policy on the matter.' 73
It is here submitted, however, that native marriage laws were
once valid as the governing lex loci for marriages and because of
the impossibility of complying with English legal requirements
due to existing conditions. The latter ground can no longer be ac-
tively relied upon in the face of modern transportation and com-
munication systems. The former argument, along with a further
one founded upon the acceptance of custom and consensual mar-
riages by English and Canadian law, must now be briefly in-
spected on a provincial and territorial basis to determine if they
continue to apply or if they have been overhauled by valid legisla-
tion.
Present Canadian Marriage Legislation
The government of Canada has not enacted explicit legislation
in relation to marriages involving native people. There are vir-
tually no federal statutory provisions specifically affecting the
Metis and Inuit peoples, while the Indian Act is structured on the
169. [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1166; 33 B.C.R. 109 (B.C.C.A.).
170. [19611 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N.W.T.T.C.).
171. See SANDERS, supra note 34, at 51-62. The Quebec Superior Court has considered
and rejected the validity of longhouse marriages on the basis that an Indian chief who
presides over the ceremony is not a "competent officer recognized by law" as required by
Articles 128 of the Civil Code. (Gabriel v. Curotte and A.G. for Quebec, unrep. Mar. 3,
1977, No. 05-013721-764). This decision should be restricted solely to Quebec by virtue of
the strict statutory requirements in force in that province. In addition, the Court did not
consider any of the relevant case law on customary marriages.
172. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
173. For an excellent discussion of DIAND'S position over the years, see SANDERS,
supra note 34, at 45-51.
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presumption that provincial marriage legislation will apply to
status Indians by virtue of section 88 of that Act. 74 On the sur-
face, this appears to be a reasonable assumption in light of the
Lavell and Bedard cases.'7 5 Putting aside an argument that Indian
sovereignty continues to exist and would apply to this area,7 6 as
that is an issue which goes beyond the scope of this paper, this
proposition might be questioned in that provincial statutes
governing marriage, although general in nature and not directed
in any important way toward native people, have the effect of
validating or invalidating Indian marriages. This process in turn
governs the registration and involuntary enfranchisement of
status Indian women and their children.' Therefore, it is
arguable that provincial marriage legislation cannot apply if it af-
fects the "Indianness" of a person, as indicated, in reference to
other issues, by Justice Dickson in Kruger & Manuel v. The
Queen"' and by Chief Justice Laskin in Natural Parents v.
Superintendent of Child Welfare. 1 9
The federal government would be within its constitutional
authority in enacting native marriage legislation or in amending
the Indian Act 8' to recognize custom marriages. This approach
has already been implemented for the purposes of dealing with
the inheritance of a deceased Indian male intestate under the In-
dian Estates Regulations,'I' and for recognizing children adopted
by custom.'1 2 Furthermore, Indian custom marriages have been
sporadically accepted as valid by DIAND in regard to its effects
on registration.' 83 Federal legislative action would present a quick
resolution to the uncertainty in the law and clarify the position
across the country.
Currently, provincial and territorial legislation is being con-
sidered as determinative of the validity of customary marriages
involving Indian, Inuit, or Metis people. Since none of the ap-
plicable statutes specifically void customary marriages, they must
be examined individually in terms of how they respond to consen-
174. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
175. Attorney General v. Lavell, Isaac v. Bedard, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, (1973), 38
D.L.R. (3d) 481.
176. For a discussion of this issue, see MORSE, supra note 55, at 21-23.
177. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6 §§ 10-12, 14-16, 48, and 109-10.
178. [1977] 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434 (S.C.C.), at 439-40.
179. [19761 60 D.L.R. (3d) 148 (S.C.C.), at 154.
180. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
181. C.R.C., c. 954, § 14.
182. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6 § 48(16).
183. See note 173, supra.
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sual or irregular marriages as there are substantial differences in
approach among the jurisdictions.
All the pertinent statutes across the country are designed so as
to establish a procedure for having marriages formally solem-
nized and to regulate who is given the authority to conduct the
wedding ceremony. In Newfoundland, the Solemnization of Mar-
riage Act"8 4 was revamped in 1974 to transform the former
Act, '8 which seemed to make the statutory formalities man-
datory and exclusive without containing a curative or saving pro-
vision, into one that possesses a required procedure along with a
curative provision. Now the Act contains section 44, which reads
as follows:
Presumption of Validity of Certain Marriages
44. If the parties to a marriage solemnized in good faith and in-
tended to be in compliance with the Act were not under a legal
disqualification to contract the marriage and after such solem-
nization have lived together and co-habited as man and wife,
the marriage shall be deemed to have been validly solemnized,
notwithstanding that the person who solemnized the marriage
was not authorized to solemnize marriage and notwithstanding
any irregularity or insufficiency in the issue of the licence.' 86
This provision is very similar to the one in operation in Ontario,
which declares:
31. If the parties to a marriage solemnized in good faith and in-
tended to be in compliance with this Act are not under a legal
disqualification to contract such marriage and after such sol-
emnization have lived together and cohabited as man and wife,
such marriage shall be deemed a valid marriage, notwith-
standing that the person who solemnized the marriage was not
authorized to solemnize marriage, and notwithstanding the
absence of or any irregularity or insufficiency in the publica-
tion of banns or the issue of the licence.18 7
The predecessor of this latter provision had been given a very
184. S. Nfld. 1974, c. 81, as amended, 1975, c. 5; 1975-76, c. 48; and 1977, c. 66.
185. R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 355.
186. S. Nfld. 1974, c. 81, as amended 1975.
187. Marriage Act, S.O. 1977, c. 42, § 31. It is interesting to note that this Act
renders registered Indians exempt from any license fee if both parties are Indians and or-
dinarily resident on the reserve (§ 16). The lieutenant governor may also appoint a
member of a band, who is recommended by the band council, as an issuer of marriage
licenses (§ 11(2)).
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broad interpretation by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Alspector
v. Alspector.18 8 Therefore, as long as the parties intend the mar-
riage to be a legally valid one, it can be submitted that a native
customary marriage is valid in these two jurisdictions.
In Alberta the legislation also validates marriages which suffer
from some error, omission, or unintended noncompliance with
the statute. Although it empowers the courts to grant a declara-
tion of validity, it does not appear that the validity of the mar-
riage is dependent upon such an order. The relevant section
states:
23.(1) A marriage is not invalidated by reason only of a
contravention of or non-compliance with this Act
(a) by the person who solemnized the marriage, or
(b) by the person who issued the licence for the marriage,
and the Supreme Court may, if satisfied it is proper to do so,
declare that the marriage was lawfully solemnized notwith-
standing any such contravention or non-compliance.
(2) An application for an order under subsection (1)
may be made on petition by
(a) a party to the marriage, or
(b) the Attorney General, or
(c) the Director,
either ex parte or upon such notice as the judge directs. 8 '
Although the Manitoba curative provision contains several
prerequisites for its operation, that section would be sufficient to
validate native custom marriages generally. It says:
Validating all marriages after one year between persons not
under legal disqualification notwithstanding irregularities.
36. Every marriage heretofore or hereafter solemnized be-
tween persons not under a legal disqualification to contract
such a marriage shall, after one year from the time of the
solemnization thereof, or upon the death of either of the par-
ties before the expiry of that time, be deemed a valid marriage
so far as respects the civil rights in the province of the parties
or their issue, and in respect of all matters within the jurisdic-
tion of the Legislature, notwithstanding that the clergyman,
minister, or other person, who solemnized the marriage was
188. [1957] O.R. 454 at 465.
189. Marriage Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 226, § 23, as amended.
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not duly authorized to solemnize marriages, and notwithstand-
ing any irregularity or insufficiency in the proclamation of in-
tention to intermarry, or in the dispensation thereof, or in the
issue of the licence, or notwithstanding the entire absence of
either: Provided that the parties after the solemnization lived
together and cohabited as man and wife, and that the validity
of the marriage has not before such death or prior to the expiry
of the said time been questioned in any suit or action; and pro-
vided further that nothing in this section makes valid any such
marriage in case either of the parties thereto had or has pre-
vious to the death of the other and previous to the expiration
of the one year contracted matrimony according to law, in
which case the validity of the marriage shall be determined as if
this section had not been enacted.1 90
At the other end of the spectrum lie Saskatchewan and Prince
Edward Island. The former had a saving provision which would
have been sufficient, but it was repealed in 1966.191 The legisla-
tion presently in force there only overcomes irregularities in rela-
tion to the proclamation of the intention to marry' 92 and the is-
suance of a license, 93 neither of which occur in custom mar-
riages. Prince Edward Island also has no provision validating
defective marriages; however, the statute also does not require
compliance with it for the marriage to be valid in the first
place. 194 The legislation in Nova Scotia expressly renders the
statutory formalities mandatory and exclusive,' 95 with the excep-
tion of marriages performed by unregistered members of the
clergy' 96 or which were celebrated many years ago.' 97 New
Brunswick does have a rather broad curative provision, but it on-
ly applies where there has been a religious ceremony as it states:
28. Every marriage heretofore solemnized in the province in
good faith before any clergyman where the parties so married
have cohabited together as man and wife shall be deemed to be
and is hereby declared valid, notwithstanding any real or sup-
posed want of legal authority in the clergyman to solemnize
190. The Marriage Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. M-50 § 36, as amended.
191. Marriage Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 338, § 46(1), repealed by S.S. 1966, c. 36, § 6.
192. Marriage Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. M-4, § 18.
193. Id., § 33.
194. Marriage Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. M-5.
195. Solemnization of Marriage Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 287, § 12, as amended.
196. Id., § 10.
197. Id., §§ 9 and 40.
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such marriage, and notwithstanding the want of licence [sic] or
publication of banns or the absence of witnesses under which
the marriage was solemnized, or any other legal objection
thereto, but nothing herein has the effect of confirming or
rendering valid a marriage between parties who were not legally
competent to enter into a marriage contract by reason of con-
sanguinity, affinity or otherwise.' 98
British Columbia, the Yukon Territory, and the Northwest
Territories all possess legislation which validates marriages solem-
nized by an unregistered clergyman if the parties apply to the ap-
propriate official. The statute in British Columbia is represen-
tative of the three jurisdictions:
40. (1) Where it is made to appear by statutory declaration
to the satisfaction of the Director that a marriage has been
solemnized in the province in good faith and intended com-
pliance with this Act by a minister or clergyman who was not
duly registered as authorized to solemnize marriage, and in ig-
norance of the requirements of this Act, and where neither of
the parties to the marriage was at the time under any legal dis-
qualification to contract the marriage, and the parties there-
after lived together and cohabited as husband and wife, and
where neither of the parties has since contracted valid marriage
according to law, and where the validity of the marriage has
not been questioned by action in any Court, the Director may
by written declaration signed by him declare that the re-
quirements of this Act as to registration of the minister or
clergyman shall be waived in respect of that marriage, and that
the solemnization of the marriage shall be deemed to be and
have been from the date of the solemnization lawful and valid;
and, upon publication in the Gazette of a notice by the Direc-
tor of the making of the declaration, the solemnization of the
marriage shall for all purposes be deemed to be and to have
been from the date of the solemnization lawful and valid, not-
withstanding the fact that the minister or clergyman was not at
the time duly registered as authorized to solemnize marriage.
(2) Where a declaration has been made by the Director,
and notice thereof has been published under subsection (1) in
respect of a marriage, the issue of that marriage shall for all
purposes be deemed to be and to have been legitimate from the
time of birth; but nothing in this subsection affects any right,
198. Marriage Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-3, § 28, as amended.
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title, or interest in or to property where the right, title, or in-
terest has vested in any person prior to the publication of the
notice. 99
These enactments are similar in nature to the one in New
Brunswick, except that these three require an application to be
made in order to be effective, as they all refer to defects in a mar-
riage that was solemnized in good faith by a minister or
clergyman. Professor Sanders has submitted that the former three
statutes are sufficient to validate custom marriages while the New
Brunswick statute is not.200 It is difficult to understand the ra-
tionale for his distinction, as this writer regards them as relatively
equivalent, other than for the requirement to invoke the curative
provision. It is arguable, however, that all four statutes should be
broadly interpreted within the spirit of their overall intendment,
which is not to invalidate marriages. The policy concern of this
type of legislation was addressed by Dr. Lushington in Cattersall
v. Sweetman201 when he stated that:
I am of the opinion that, in any case of doubt, I ought never to
pronounce a marriage null and void. In this case I do entertain
(to express my opinion in the weakest terms) the gravest doubt
as to this act creating a nullity. I think so, firstly, because I
find no instance of any words in any Marriage Act being held
to import a nullity, if the act did not expressly create a nullity.
Secondly, if this interpretation should be at variance with the
decisions of other Courts on other matters, it must always be
remembered that marriage is essentially distinguished from
every other species of contract, either of legislative or judicial
determination; that this distinction has been universally admit-
ted; that not only is all legal presumption in favour of the
validity and against the nullity of marriage, but it is so on this
principle; that a legislative enactment to annul a marriage de
facto is a penal enactment, not only penal to the parties, but
highly penal to the innocent offspring, and therefore to be con-
strued according to the acknowledged rule, most strictly.20 2
This reasoning of Dr. Lushington was adopted in Wylie v. Pat-
199. Marriage Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 232, § 40, as amended. See also Marriage Or-
dinance, C.O.Y.T. 1976, c. M-3, § 48; and Marriage Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c.
M-5, § 48, as amended.
200. SANDERS, supra note 34, at 30-32.
201. [1845] 1 Rob. Ecc. 304.
202. Id. at 320-21.
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ton2"3 by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal on these terms:
In the present case the Act under consideration while prohibi-
tive, does not declare a nullity or penalize the parties to the
marriage, and there is an innocent child to be considered. On
the highest grounds of public policy, all legal presumptions are
in favour of the validity of a marriage." 4
The same approach is evident in a number of the cases
previously discussed, such as Re Noah Estate,25 and in non-
custom marriages by the Ontario and British Columbia courts.20 6
It is, thus, proper to submit that the courts would either broadly
construe these curative provisions so as to validate custom mar-
riages, or interpret each statute as a whole as not affecting the
validity of a form of marriage which was valid prior to the recep-
tion of English law and largely upheld by the relevant case law
ever since. In certain specific cases it may be possible to argue on
the evidence before the court that the particular marriage comes
within the strict wording of the legislation. This would be feasible
if the native custom marriage involved a celebration in the
presence of a respected elder. The latter could then be regarded as
an unregistered member of the clergy of the traditional religion,
as was suggested in Re Noah Estate.0 7
The final jurisdiction of interest is Quebec. The Civil Code 20 8
contains an express provision requiring compliance concerning
proper solemnization, which states: "Art. 128. Marriage must be
solemnized openly, by a competent officer recognized by law."120 9
There is no mechanism to avoid fully the consequences of non-
compliance with this provision. That is, failure to properly
203. [1930] 1 D.L.R. 747.
204. Id. at 752.
205. Note 171, supra, at 199-200.
206. See, e.g., Clause v. Clause, [1956] O.W.N. 449 (N.C.J.); Penner v. Penner,
[1947] 4 D.L.R. 879 (B.C.S.C.); Friedman v. Smookler, [1964] 43 D.L.R. (2d) 210 (Ont.
H.C.); Peppialt v. Peppialt, [1916] 30 D.L.R. 1 (Ont. S.C.A.D.), Kerr v. Kerr, [1934] 2
D.L.R. 369 (S.C.C.) and H. HahlIo, Nullity of Marriage, in 2 STUDIES IN CANADIAN FAI.
LY LAW, ed. by D. Mendes da Costa (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972), 651, at 661-64.
207. [1961] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185, 202-203 (N.W.T.T.C.).
208. C.C. 1979.
209. Id., ch. IV, of Actions for Annulling Marriage, art. 128. This provision in-
validated a longhouse marriage performed by a chief in Gabriel v. Curotte & A.G. for
Quebec (unrep., Mar. 3, 1977 Que. S.C.). In addition, Article 156 states: "Every mar-
riage which has not been contracted openly, nor solemnized before a competent officer,
may be contested by the parties themselves and by all those who have an existing and ac-
tual interest, saving the right of the court to decide according to circumstances."
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celebrate and solemnize a marriage will render it a nullity. The
stringency of this statutory requirement is moderated somewhat
in terms of the civil effects of the nullity by the following articles:
Art. 162. Nevertheless, in the case of articles 159 and 160, if
there be children issue of two persons who lived publicly as
husband and wife, and who are both dead, the legitimacy of
such children cannot be contested solely on the pretext that no
certificate is produced, whenever such legitimacy is supported
by possession of the status uncontradicted by act of birth.
Art. 163. A marriage although declared null, produced civil
effects, as well with regard to the husband and wife and with
regard to the children if contracted in good faith.
Art. 164. If good faith exist on the part of one of the parties
only, the marriage produces civil effects in favor of such party
alone and in favor of the children issue of the marriage."'
These latter provisions, as Sanders suggests,2 ' may well be suffi-
cient to cause a custom marriage, although void, to be accepted
so as to legitimate the children and confer the status of husband
and wife for the purposes of registration under the Indian Act" 2
as status Indians and members of the husband's band.
As a result of this legislative survey, it is possible to summarize
the situation across Canada in regard to the validity of custom
marriages, as it appears to this writer, in the following manner:
1. Four jurisdictions have curative provisions which should
validate custom marriages, namely, Newfoundland, Ontario,
Manitoba, and Alberta;
2. Four jurisdictions have saving provisions which are argu-
ably sufficient, namely, New Brunswick, British Columbia, the
Yukon, and the Northwest Territories, with the latter three re-
quiring that the provision must be invoked by an applicant in
order to be effective;
3. Two jurisdictions have mandatory formal requirements for
valid marriages which may be interpreted by the courts to nullify
custom marriages, namely, Quebec and Nova Scotia; and
4. Two jurisdictions, Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Is-
land, have neither mandatory requirements nor broad curative
provisions and therefore, custom marriages should remain valid
210. Id., arts. 162-164.
211. SANDERS, supra note 34, at 25.
212. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
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under the case law and be unaffected by the provincial legisla-
tion.
Thus, the legal position of Indian and Inuit marriages cele-
brated in accordance with traditional law is somewhat uncertain
and varies across the country. In light of "illegitimacy" rates of
four to five times the national average,2"3 and the evidence of the
frequency of custom marriages,2"4 which are often misinterpreted
as "common law" marriages, it is apparent that this uncertain
and variable situation should be rectified.
Custom Divorces in Canada
It has been mentioned in passing that the odd case has in-
dicated, directly or indirectly, that native custom divorces are
valid for the purposes of terminating custom marriages so long as
the divorce occurs within the jurisdiction of the native law.
Justice Monk seemed tentatively to accept the validity of Cree
divorce law, but he restricted it to Indian territory by comment-
ing as follows:
Then it was said, and much insisted on, that one of the in-
cidents of this Cree marriage was, that it might be dissolved at
pleasure ....
How far this is to be regarded as a part of their law of mar-
riage, or merely an abuse of it, tolerated among savages, it is
difficult for me to determine. It was argued by Mr. Perkins, in
his remarkable reply and summing up of the plaintiff's preten-
sions in this case, that, admitting the argument of the defen-
dant to the fullest extent, and that marriage among the In-
dians, or even when between a squaw and a Christian, a Euro-
pean or American, is dissolvable at the will of the husband or
of either party-such a concession can have no effect upon this
case. If this Cree marriage was dissolvable at pleasure, Mr.
Connolly could perhaps have repudiated his Indian wife, had
he done so while residing among the Crees, or where such a
barbarous usage prevailed. He might have done so then, if he
could do so at all-but when he came to Canada that right
ceased. At all events, he could not dissolve the marriage of his
213. Indians Conditions: a survey (Ottawa: DIAND, 1980), at 204.
214. Corrigan, supra note 141 and the evidence of 50% consensual marriages on
several reserves in Saskatchewan in Exparte Cote, [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 383 (Sask. Q.B.),
at 384.
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own free will; he could not repudiate her in Canada, in virtue
and in pursuance of this Indian usage.2 15
Justice Gregory, in Rex v. Williams,21 6 accepted the validity of
two previous custom divorces to the extent of regarding the
defendant's third wife, by a custom marriage, as neither a com-
pellable nor a competent witness for the Crown. However, there
appears not to be a single case in the Canadian jurisprudence that
has upheld a custom divorce when that was the precise issue
before the court.
It is at least arguable that divorces pursuant to traditional In-
dian and Inuit law were once as valid as customary marriages.
There is no logical reason for denying their validity after one has
recognized custom marriage laws. Even if this was true, one must
still consider the impact of the Divorce Act217 on custom
divorces. Professor Sanders suggests that the federal legislation
exclusively occupies the field such that custom marriages should
be terminated only by a divorce which complied with the re-
quirements of that Act.2"' This statute, however, does not con-
tain a section which expressly states that the only way to obtain a
divorce within Canada is under that enactment. The Act does
contain the following section:
23. (1) The Dissolution and Annulment of Marriages Act,
the Divorce Jurisdiction Act, the Divorce Act (Ontario) in so
far as it relates to the dissolution of marriage, and the British
Columbia Divorce Appeals Act are repealed.
23. (2) Subject to subsection 19(3), all other laws respecting
divorce that were in force in Canada or any province immedi-
ately before the 2nd day of July 1968 are repealed, but nothing
in this Act shall be construed as repealing any such law to the
extent that it constitutes authority for any other matrimonial
cause.
219
Since subsection (1) lists several specific statutes, it could be
contended that the phrase "all other laws respecting divorce"
within subsection (2) referred solely to statutes and not customary
law or judicial pronouncements thereon. It must be accepted that
215. Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] 11 L.C.J. 197, at 255.
216. [1930] 30 B.C.R. 303 (B.C.S.C.).
217. R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, as amended.
218. SANDERS, supra note 34, at 45.
219. Supra note 61, § 23.
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this is a tenuous argument and that Professor Sanders's opinion
is more likely to reflect the position that would be taken by the
Canadian courts. The revival of Indian and Inuit sovereignty,
which includes the desire to control all family matters, might in-
fluence the judiciary or Parliament to recognize custom divorces.
Custom Adoptions in Canada
The Indian and Inuit peoples have also maintained a system of
adoption of children, pursuant to their law, for untold centuries.
Customary adoptions have continued unabated since the arrival
of settlers from Europe and are still common today, despite the
presence of a highly organized child welfare system administered
by the provinces. Adoptions that proceed pursuant to native law
occur outside of the mainstream of the Canadian legal system
and without attention being paid to the formal requirements of
provincial adoption legislation. As a result, it is impossible to
ascertain exactly where in Canada customary adoptions are being
practiced and in what numbers. This writer is aware that the
practice is common among the Inuit all across the Arctic and the
Indians in most provinces and the territories. Only the courts in
the Northwest Territories have had the opportunity to consider
formally the legal validity of this process, and even there this
issue has arisen just in the last two decades.
The first such occasion offered itself one month after the
enactment of the Child Welfare Ordinance " in Re Adoption of
Katie E7-1807.11' The new ordinance contained the following:
Every person who places a child with another person on the
understanding that the other person will adopt the child, shall,
within thirty days after the day on which the child has been
placed, notify the superintendent. Every person who fails to
comply with this is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of
not more than $100.22
Justice Sissons commented on the logic behind this legislation in
his memoirs by saying:
For an Eskimo this provision was utter nonsense. At most
points there is no regular mall service; it goes in or out by
chance, perhaps once or twice a year. There is, generally speak-
220. O.N.W.T. 1961, c. 3.
221. [1962] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 686; 38 W.W.R. 100 (N.W.T.T.C.).
222. O.N.W.T. 1961, c. 3, § 105.
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ing, no-one in authority locally, or perhaps within five hundred
miles, who could be notified. "i ne average Eskimo cannot read
or write and it would certainly be difficult for him to notify the
superintendent, who is an unexplainable personality far away....
No great intellect was required to predict the mess, and the
court predicted it accurately. The intentions of the promoters
were also clear, and [they were made evident] in the very next
adoption hearing a month later in Frobisher Bay-an applica-
tion for an Eskimo girl named Katie . . 223
In the Katie case,224 the Territorial Court was presented with
an adoption petition by two welfare officers of the Department
of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources on behalf of an Inuit
couple. The new legislation was not available to the officers when
they prepared the petition so that it was not in compliance with
the requirements of Part IV of the Ordinance. The couple was
not eligible under the Ordinance, which required a certificate of
marriage, 25 as they were married pursuant to Inuit customary
law. Therefore, the Court could neither simply cure the defective
petition nor adjourn the matter for correction. The alternatives
available were to reject the petition permanently or to recognize
the adoption as valid under Inuit customary law. Justice Sissons
examined the legislation and found that it did not reflect the
realities of the North or the actual practice that was intended to
be followed. One example of this is that the Ordinance required
the adopted child to assume the surname of the adopting
parents,226 in spite of the fact that the Inuit at that time did not
generally have surnames. The superintendent of Child Welfare
was required to certify to the Territorial Court that to his
knowledge the applicant was an appropriate parent and in his
opinion deserved the adoption order. 227 The superintendent,
however, was based in Ottawa and could not properly comply
with these conditions personally as he was required to do by the
express language of the Ordinance.
The Territorial Court examined the matter and stated that
custom adoptions by Indian and Inuit parents were common and
they had not been abrogated by federal legislation as a result of
the Canadian Bill of Rights. Sissons, J., then proceeded to
223. SISSONS, supra note 130, at 142-43.
224. [1962] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 686.
225. O.N.W.T. 1961, c. 3.
226. Id., § 97.
227. Id., §§ 91 and 93(3).
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deliver a declaratory order stating that "adoptions 'made accord-
ing to the laws of the Territories' include adoptions in accor-
dance with Indian or Eskimo custom" '228 such that they had the
same effect as if they had been made pursuant to the terms of the
Child Welfare Ordinance. 229
In his autobiography, Justice Sissons remarked upon the ad-
ministrative response to his ruling by saying:
The bureaucrats didn't contest the ruling but sought to ignore
it and adoption applications clogged the channels they were
supposed to go through. They piled up on desks all over the
north. The unnecessary reports put no intolerable strain on the
rank-and-file welfare workers who had plenty of other duties.
People who complied in every way with the requirements for
an adoption order waited years for justice but the bureaucrats
could see nothing but beauty in the monster they had spawned
and would hear of no changes.23 °
The situation became intolerable over the next few years as ap-
plications piled up from Inuit adoptive parents who wished the
security of a court order and proof of their status so as to satisfy
the civil authorities. Sissons, J., recorded his initiatives to resolve
the backlog by observing:
By early '65 the backlog was so bad that the superintendent
came to Yellowknife and agreed to reduce the number of
reports. Ben Sivertz, the new commissioner of the Territories,
got some remedial legislation through the territorial council
and he approved my plan to go on circuit through the eastern
Arctic to register as many adoptions in accordance with Eskimo
custom as I could find. I would give each qualified applicant a
"declaratory judgment," declaring the adoption to be as good
as one under the ordinance. ...
The court issued more than two hundred declaratory orders
in the ten days of the circuit, 76 at Frobisher Bay alone. From
this concentration of cases the court gained a rare intensified
insight into the place of adoption in Eskimo society. Adoptions
are a family and community concern, like marriage. Some cus-
toms are surprising to us: grandparents adopting a grandchild
to have someone to look after them; an unmarried forty-five-
228. [1962] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 686, 690, referring to the provisions of § 103 of the Or-
dinance.
229. O.N.W.T. 1961, c. 3.
230. SISSONS, supra note 130, at 143.
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year-old woman adopting a child for company. But in Eskimo
society the old look after the young and the young look after
the old and each needs the other. I caught glimpses, hundreds
of them, of a people in transition. But while they are in transi-
tion they need the strength of their traditional customs, which
are geared to survival in a harsh land, and these traditions in-
clude the ones on adoption.23" '
Hundreds of Inuit custom adoptions have subsequently been
processed in this fashion by Justice Sissons and his successors,
Morrow and Tallis, JJ.232 The procedure of obtaining a dec-
laratory order for custom adoptions has become widespread
among the Inuit and accepted by the territorial government and
DIAND.233 Adoptions made in accordance with Indian law have
received the same treatment by the Court, although applications
for judicial sanction are less frequent.234 The validity of Indian
custom adoption was upheld on the same grounds as in the Katie
case 23 in Re Beaulieu's Adoption Petition.2 16 The wisdom and
legal correctness of this approach was later reconsidered and
maintained by the Territorial Court 237 and unanimously affirmed
by the Court of Appeal.238
Therefore, the validity of custom adoptions, with or without
judicial approval, cannot be doubted in the Northwest Ter-
ritories. 239 The courts there have developed a procedure and a set
of standards which are applied to these applications. The court
generally requires all adult parties to the adoption to be Inuit or
Indian for it to be considered a custom adoption. 210 The only ex-
231. Id. at 143-44.
232. Justice Morrow referred to having personally approved of 248 custom adoptions
by 1972 in Re Deborah E4-789; Tucktoo et ux. v. Kitchooalik & Enooyak, [1972] 3
W.W.R. 194; 27 D.L.R. (3d) 225, at 195. SANDERS, note 34, supra, at 66, refers to 59
custom adoptions in 1971-72 and 96 more in 1972-73.
233. See the comments of Morrow, J., on the attitude of the superintendent of Child
Welfare in Re Beaulieu's Adoption Petition, [1969] 3 D.L.R. (3d) 479; 67 W.W.R. 669
(N.W.T.T.C.), at 479.
234. SANDERS, supra note 34, at 70.
235. [1962] 32 D.L.R. (2d) 686.
236. See note 233, supra.
237. See note 232, supra.
238. [1972] 5 W.W.R. 205, 28 D.L.R. (3d) 483.
239. The pertinent legislation has been amended to reflect the acceptance of this pro-
cedure in 1972 and again in 1973.
240. See, e.g., Re Kakfwi (unrep., Jan. 19, 1970, N.W.T.T.C.), where it is stated that
an Indian custom adoption could not be accepted because one of the adoptive parents was
a white man who had married the child's mother after the natural father had died.
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ception to this stipulation arose in Re Wah-shee24' where the
court accepted the validity of an adoption made pursuant to the
customary law of the Dogrib Indians even though the adoptive
mother was Caucasian. Justice Morrow was of the belief that
Caroline Wah-shee had been fully accepted as a band member by
the people of Fort Rae, that she had become a status Indian by
virtue of section 1 1(1)(f) of the Indian Act,242 and that the adop-
tion had been performed in compliance with Dogrib law. It ap-
pears that custom adoptions by the Metis have yet to be recog-
nized by the courts of the Northwest Territories or elsewhere.
There have been no reported decisions on custom adoptions in
any of the provinces or in the Yukon, although it was mentioned
in passing without criticism in Re Birth Registration No.
67-09-02227223 as the objective of the natural parents. It is dif-
ficult, then, to determine what is the legal position of custom
adoptions in the rest of the country. The approach of the North-
west Territories Supreme Court in judicially confirming custom
adoptions through declaratory orders, in spite of noncompliance
with the formal requirements of Part IV of the Child Welfare Or-
dinance,2"4 has been sanctioned by the Territorial Council by vir-
tue of section 79, which states:
79. Where, in the opinion of a judge hearing a petition for
the adoption of a child, it is in the best interests of the child
not to require compliance with a provision of this Part, other
than subsection 82(1), that is required before an adoption order
241. [1976] 57 D.L.R. (3d) 743 (N.W.T.S.C.).
242. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
243. [1974] 1 W.W.R. 19 (B.C.S.C.), rev'd sub nom. Re Adoption Act, [1974] 3
W.W.R. 363 (B.C.C.A.), aff'd, [1976] 60 D.L.R. (3d) 148 (S.C.C.). At trial, Justice
Tyrwhitt-Drake originally delivered an unreported judgment on Apr. 6, 1973, in which he
stated: "I am of the view that native custom, speaking very generally (for there are slight
differences between those of one people and another), recognizes a form of adoption: the
rearing of children was and is not the exclusive responsibility of the parents, though they
have primary rights and duties. Grandparents, uncles and aunts share this responsibility
to a great extent. In native society, originally matrilineal, it is usual nowadays for grand-
mothers and aunts to take in and rear children when their parents, for one reason or
another, cannot themselves do so. Many instances of this custom were given (and see also
James Sewid, Guests Never Leave Hungry, 1969, University of Washington Press). I
think it is general, and much in use today. It brings about something very close to our no-
tion of adoption: a notion which is common to all legal systems, West Coast native
custom as well as our Roman derived law." Id. at 2-3. Quoted in NATIvE FAMILIES AND
THE LAW: TENTH REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S LAW
(Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1975), at 37-38.
244. R.O.W.N.T., 1974, c. C-3.
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may be made, the judge may waive the provision and make an
order of adoption of the child.245
An analysis of adoption legislation in the remaining jurisdic-
tions discloses that the Yukon possesses a permissive provision
similar in nature to the operative one in the Northwest Ter-
ritories. Therefore, custom adoptions in accordance with Indian
law should be valid and eligible for judicial confirmation in the
Yukon if the adoptive parents were to desire a declaration to that
effect. 2 6 The Manitoba statute would be sufficient to confirm
custom adoptions if they have been maintained for at least three
years as a de facto adoption.247 The legislation in place in Ontario
contains provisions allowing for adoptions by relatives that can
circumvent the normal requirements of the Child Welfare Act.24 '
Therefore, the court could give its judicial blessing to custom
adoptions, at least when the adoptive parents are related to the
child by blood, which normally occurs in traditional adoptions.
The pertinent statutes in force in Nova Scotia 2 9 and Saskatche-
wan 2 0 also do not require strict compliance with all their terms in
order to obtain a court order of adoption.
The adoption provisions in the remaining provincial enact-
ments all appear to be mandatory and exclusive. Since adoption
theoretically did not exist at common law,2"' although the prac-
tice itself was widely known, one cannot look to the common law
for assistance. It does seem that native people could not seek
judicial approval for custom adoptions under the legislation
presently in force in Prince Edward Island, 251 New Brunswick,"13
Newfoundland, 2" Quebec,255 Alberta,256 or British Columbia.257
245. Id., § 79.
246. Child Welfare Ordinance, C.O.Y.T. 1976, c. C-4, § 67(2).
247. Child Welfare Act, S.M. 1974, c. 30, § 103(1) as amended.
248. Child Welfare Act, S.O. 1978, c. 85, §§ 73(2)(a) and 75(5)(a).
249. Children's Services Act, C.S.N.S., 1979, c. C-13, § 21(1).
250. Family Services Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. F-7, § 51(1)(c), which creates the possibility
for otherwise ineligible people of obtaining ministerial authority to adopt.
251. There was no recognition of adoption under English law until the enactment of
the Adoption of Children Act, 1926 U.K., c. 29. See also 21 Hals., 3d ed., paras. 484 and
485.
252. Adoption Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. A-1.
253. Adoption Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. A-3 as amended.
254. Adoption of Children, S. Nfld. 1972, c. 36, § 4(1) as amended. However, § 13
does approve de facto adoptions in existence since 1962 or before that date.
255. Adoption Act, L.R. 1977, c. A-7, § 2, as amended.
256. Child Welfare Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 45, as amended.
257. Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4, as amended.
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Nonetheless, it may be possible to assert successfully that native
custom adoptions remain valid pursuant to the survival of native
law within those jurisdictions as the original native law has never
been expressly revoked.
Remedial legislation in some form will probably be useful, if
not essential, to permit native people to retain their traditional
system of custom adoptions and to obtain judicial approval for
this system. The latter clearly provides certainty and security to
the adoptive parents and removes any potential difficulties in
relation to inheritance, school enrollment, mother's allowance
payments, and the provision of other social services.
The Royal Commission on Family and Children's Law of
British Columbia recommended to the government of that prov-
ince that the existing legislation should be amended to expressly
recognize custom adoptions.2 58 The federal government could
also clearly resolve this issue by expanding the limited recognition
of custom adoptions for inheritance purposes under the Indian
Act" to validate all traditional adoptions by status Indians, or
by all native people. Indian and Inuit governments could also
assert their sovereignty by enacting their own legislation designed
to confirm all adoptions conducted according to customary law.
V. Conclusions
A brief glimpse of the tragic social conditions and cir-
cumstances affecting the life experience of the Indian, Metis, and
Inuit peoples was delineated at the beginning of this article.
Although these statistics mask the harsh realities of daily life for
the indigenous peoples, they do clearly indicate the magnitude of
these events in a way that is finally beginning to gain the attention
of Canadian social planners and governmental policy analysts.
The Canadian Council on Social Development has embarked
upon a two-year project on Indian child welfare and adoption
that is intended as a means of promoting public discussion and
governmental action in these areas.
The concerns of the native people are also becoming more con-
centrated and concrete. The Canadian Indian Lawyers Assoc-
iation has organized a conference in each of the last two years on
this subject of Indian child welfare to promote the development
of new approaches to solving these social and economic pro-
258. See note 21, supra, at 37-43.
259. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, § 48(16).
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blems. More and more Indian communities are addressing these
issues directly by delivering their own child welfare programs
and/or by enacting their own family laws.2 60 The assertion of
sovereignty by the original peoples will'definitely continue to in-
crease and this action will include efforts to control all aspects of
law related to family matters. This effort will be largely based on
a return to traditional values and legal principles.
This article has addressed only one aspect of the total picture,
namely, the degree to which the Canadian judiciary has respected
traditional law in the past and is likely to in the future. Although
it can be concluded that customary Indian and Inuit law has
clearly survived within the common law system, albeit in a
sporadic way as its legal effectiveness has varied across the coun-
try, one can hope for a brighter future for customary law. The
core concepts of Indian and Inuit family law possess great mean-
ing for the indigenous population, and they have much to offer
to the rest of Canadian society.
260. See, e.g., Spallumcheen Indian Band of British Columbia By-law No. 3, 1980,
entitled, A By-law for the care of our Indian Children.
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